




"One wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimi-
nation-or more accurately, race discrimination against non-





Justice Blackmun's famous dissent highlighted a stark truth about
the Supreme Court's late 1980s' equality jurisprudence-an accelerat-
ing judicial myopia that Justice Marshall characterized as turning a
blind eye to racial history and contemporary realities.2 That judicial
blindness to racial context presumed a level present-day social and
economic playing field. And it thereby legitimated dismantling "pref-
erential" government programs, particularly those designed to uplift
racial communities from long years of legally and socially sanctioned
subordination.3
That rising jurisprudential tide shifted, however, imperceptibly at
first, then momentously. Over the last decade, without expressly say-
ing so, the Court transformed the Equal Protection Clause's strict
scrutiny analysis. A minority of the current Court continues to argue
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1. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 543-46 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
3. See infra Part III.B.2.
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forcefully for a largely context-blind version of strict scrutiny that au-
tomatically invalidates nearly all racial classifications 4-scrutiny that
is "strict in theory and fatal in fact."5 A majority of the Justices, how-
ever, now supports a more contextualized approach6 for reviewing,
and sometimes affirming, government initiatives that involve race.7
This more flexible, contextualized version of strict scrutiny is "no
less strict"8 than its traditional counterpart-it still closely examines
ends, means, and motives. For government initiatives designed to ad-
dress the effects of long-standing discrimination, however, it is "less
fatal."9 As the Court explained in 2005, the mere invocation of strict
scrutiny no longer predetermines the legal outcome. It "says nothing
about the ultimate validity of any particular law."1
What it does mean is a genuine searching judicial inquiry into the
linkage of racial group history to current social and economic condi-
tions undergirding the challenged classification. Both its strong pro-
4. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("In the eyes of government, we are just one race here."); id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("The government may not make distinctions on the basis of race."). But see Johnson v. Califor-
nia, 543 U.S. 499, 541 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Adarand's statement that 'all racial classi-
fications' are subject to strict scrutiny [only] addressed the contention that classifications
favoring rather than disfavoring blacks are exempt" from strict scrutiny); id. at 1157 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("The Constitution has always demanded less [than strict scrutiny for racial classifica-
tions] within the prison walls.").
5. Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (coining this well-known,
aptly descriptive phrase). See also, Jaideep Venkatesan, Fatal in Fact: Federal Courts' Applica-
tion of Strict Scrutiny to Racial Preferences in Public Education, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 173
(2001) (arguing that lower federal courts employed "fatal-in-fact" strict scrutiny and thus misap-
plied Supreme Court precedent which indicated a more contextual form of strict scrutiny).
6. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("But where
race is considered 'for the purpose of achieving equality,' no automatic proscription is in order.")
(quoting Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932 (2d Cir. 1968));
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("Not every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the
use of race in that particular context."); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 (stating that strict scrutiny
takes "relevant differences" into account "to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race
in governmental decisionmaking"); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (questioning appel-
lants' invocation of Justice Harlan's "color-blind" constitutionalism and stating that "[tihis Court
has never held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances").
7. Brief of Amici Curiae the Coalition for Economic Equity et al. at 22, Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Grutter amicus brief]. Co-author of this Arti-
cle, Yamamoto, was a signatory to the brief.
8. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
9. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 8 (describing the standard as "scrutiny that [is] 'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact").
10. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30).
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ponents, Justices O'Connor,1 Ginsburg, 2 and Stevens; and its
opponents, particularly Justice Kennedy,13 acknowledge generally the
emergence of a new form of strict scrutiny review. Yet, even in its
2005 pronouncements,' 4 the Court has not formally articulated a
method for implementing its evolving mode of analysis.
What, then, is the new contextual strict scrutiny? And how does
it work? With what consequences, practical and jurisprudential? This
Article offers the first comprehensive methodological response to the
first two questions and lays a foundation for further inquiry into the
latter. It does so in three parts.
Part I concisely traces the high Court's movement from a formal
strict scrutiny analysis toward a significantly more contextualized ap-
proach. It also observes that while the justices and most commenta-
tors concur that this shift is manifest, they are uncertain about the
method of application and likely consequences.
With this uncertainty as the backdrop, Part II puts meat on the
bones by coalescing the Court's various pronouncements into a
method for operationalizing the new contextual strict scrutiny for law-
yers, judges and scholars. A workable analytical method is particu-
11. See infra notes and accompanying text; see also Linda S. Greene, The Constitution and
Racial Equality After Gratz and Grutter, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 253, 274 (2004) ("Though Justice
O'Connor did offer obeisance to strict scrutiny, her joinder of strict scrutiny with 'context' and
'deference' weakens the standard and signals a retreat from the 'skepticism' about all racial
classifications that marked her Metro dissent and her Adarand opinion.").
12. See infra notes and accompanying text. While Justice Ginsburg's opinions demonstrate
her commitment to a context-sensitive strict scrutiny, they do not support categorical strict scru-
tiny for all racial classifications. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("While
I would not disturb the programs challenged in this case ... I see today's decision as one that
allows precedent to evolve, still to be informed by and responsive to changing conditions.").
Most recently, Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer challenging as unset-
tled the Court's pronouncement that strict scrutiny is to be applied to all racial classifications.
See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Disagreeing with the Court that 'strict
scrutiny' properly applies to any and all racial classifications, but agreeing that the stereotypical
classification at hand warrants rigorous scrutiny, I join the Court's opinion.").
13. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy agreed that the
Court was no longer applying traditional strict scrutiny:
It is regrettable the Court's important holding allowing racial minorities to have their
special circumstances considered in order to improve their educational opportunities is
accompanied by a suspension of the strict scrutiny which was the predicate of allowing
race to be considered in the first place. If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to
give strict scrutiny to the use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to
approve the use of race in pursuit of student diversity. The Constitution cannot confer
the right to classify on the basis of race even in this special context absent searching
judicial review. For these reasons, though I reiterate my approval of giving appropriate
consideration to race in this one context, I must dissent in the present case.
Id. Justice Kennedy's dissent indicates that he did not entirely disagree with the Court, noting
that he approves of "giving appropriate consideration to race in this one context." Id.
14. See generally Johnson, 543 U.S. 499.
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larly important when the challenged government initiatives are
designed to promote present-day equality in the face of discriminatory
legacies.
In brief, the contextual strict scrutiny method discerned here en-
tails four analytical inquiries. First, contextual strict scrutiny takes ra-
cial group history and current racial conditions into account, as they
relate to the specific classification.15 Second, in taking relevant racial
group differences into account, contextual strict scrutiny distinguishes
classifications designed to promote inclusion from those designed to
exclude particular groups, especially groups historically excluded from
the opportunities and benefits of mainstream American life by law
and social practice.a6
Third, contextual strict scrutiny checks whether initiatives de-
signed to address group-based forms of exclusion and inequality may
actually be motivated by prejudice or harmful stereotypes.17 These
first three inquiries help to guide the assessment of whether the gov-
ernment's interest is "compelling."
Lastly, in the absence of a governmental design to perpetuate ra-
cial exclusion and in the absence of apparent negative stereotyping,
contextual strict scrutiny checks to see that the government consid-
ered a range of realistic alternatives and, if it did so, then accords a
measure of judicial respect to the government's selected means for
addressing long-standing group disadvantages."'
This analytical method for operationalizing the Court's new con-
textual strict scrutiny, which is subject to critique and refinement, is
drawn largely from language in the opinions of the Justices. 9
With the method in mind, to facilitate further inquiry, Part III of
the article teases out salient jurisprudential implications of the new
contextual strict scrutiny. Part III observes that contextual strict scru-
tiny is quietly momentous because it largely inters the long-standing
jurisprudential notion of "law as an autonomous discipline,"2 ° particu-
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See infra Part I.D.
19. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J. and
Breyer, J.). The method also draws upon arguments. advanced by various amici in Grutter. See
Grutter amicus brief, supra note 7, at 5-6.
20. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Autonomy of Law, available at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/
sela/efiss.pdf ("Law is an autonomous sphere of human activity that serves no master other than
justice."); cf. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
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larly in race cases.2 In 1987, the Court declared in McKleskey v.
Kemp 22 that vast empirically verified racial disparities in death penalty
sentencing were irrelevant to equal protection analysis;23 it marked
the apogee of the Court's acontexual race analysis. In 2003, Grutter's
emphasis on history, current racial conditions and "relevant racial dif-
ferences" informed a contemporary version of Legal Realism24-a
"racial realism ' '25 grounded in a systemic examination of social science
studies and documented historical research.26 Grutter stamped the
Court's imprimatur on multidisciplinary analysis of race in context.
Most importantly, Part III characterizes contextual strict scrutiny
as loudly significant because it marks for the first time the Court ma-
jority's controversial rejection of "formal colorblindness" as the
lynchpin for equal protection race analysis.27 Contextual analysis now
legitimates in some situations a government race-consciousness that is
designed to promote inclusion in realms of social life historically
marked by racial exclusion.
100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). Professor Fiss argued that Law and Economics and Critical
Legal Studies ("CLS") were dangerous movements because they "mean the death of the law, as
we have known it throughout history, and as we have come to admire it." Owen M. Fiss, The
Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (1986); see also Paul D. Carrington's criticism of
the emerging CLS movement, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984), and the
subsequent exchanges between Paul Brest, Guido Calabresi, Paul D. Carrington, Owen M. Fiss,
Robert W. Gordon, Phillip E. Johnson, Peter W. Martin, Louis B. Schwartz, and William W. Van
Alstyne, in "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1 (1984).
21. See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 46 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (explaining that by the 1990s, the Supreme Court had
"return[ed] to an almost classical conservative formal-activism ... by refusal to acknowledge
historical or social reality as having any relevance to judicial decision making").
22. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
23. Id. at 292-99.
24. See generally Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467 (1988)
(book review).
25. See generally Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992).
26. For a discussion of the extensive historical accounts and social science studies relied
upon by the Court in Grutter, see infra notes and accompanying text. By referring here to "the
systematic examination of social science studies" and "documented" history we are distinguish-
ing, and rejecting, the pseudo-scientific ethnography of the 19th Century and early 20th Century
that created a racial hierarchy based upon the superiority and inferiority of the races. See JOE
FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 6-9 (5th ed. 1996).
27. Contextual strict scrutiny also operates as a rejection of "formal gender-blindness" in
gender cases. See generally Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of
Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (1989); David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and
Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2002); Mary Ellen Gale, Calling in the Girl Scouts: Feminist Legal
Theory and Police Misconduct, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 691 (2001); Mary Ellen Gale, Unfinished
Women: The Supreme Court and the Incomplete Trans-Formation of Women's Rights in the
United States, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 445, 488 (1987); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No




At bottom, context matters for the Supreme Court in 2005 when
racial equality is at issue. This Article addresses what that means
methodologically and jurisprudentially.
I. THE NEW CONTEXTUAL STRICT SCRUTINY
A. "Formal" Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court initially developed the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of equal protection review to protect members of groups that
were denied full participation in the democratic political process.28
Courts first applied this traditional strict scrutiny standard to invali-
date invidious discrimination by the states.29 Because exclusionary
28. Scholars have contested the origins and content of strict scrutiny review. See JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-80 (1980) (urging
closer scrutiny of political process failures, whereby the level of review would reflect the group's
influence and access to the political process, as derived from Carolene Products Footnote Four).
Process failures require close scrutiny because "courts should protect those who can't protect
themselves politically." Id. at 160; see also AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP
129-49 (1995). This view locates Equal Protection analysis in group relationships and draws
upon an anti-subordination (or anti-caste) principle. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN
ROBES: WHY EXTREMIST RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 132-33 (2005);
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986). But see Felix
Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L.
REV. 163 (2004). Gilman argues the modern understanding of the footnote is a myth, that the
actual influence of the footnote is overstated and its fame only more recently acknowledged. See
id. at 166-67. "Far from being an epochal moment in the history of constitutional law, the foot-
note was in fact largely ignored by academics and judges until the 1970s or even 1980s. The
Court carried out its most important efforts on behalf of minorities without reference to the
footnote." Id. at 166.
Most judges locate the first explicit pronouncement of strict scrutiny in the Japanese Ameri-
can interment case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme
Court declared that racial restrictions are subject to the "most rigorous scrutiny." Id. at 216.
Despite this pronouncement, the Court in Korematsu applied a deferential standard of review in
upholding the exclusion orders. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARA-
TION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 159-66 (2001). Supreme Court cases
citing Korematsu for the "most rigid scrutiny" proposition include: Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55, 113 (1980); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 192 (1964). Justice O'Connor most recently discussed Korematsu in the strict scrutiny
context in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-18 (1995); see also YAMAMATO
ET AL., supra, at 451-55.
29. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 404 (1964) ("Race is the factor upon which
the statute operates and its involvement promotes the ultimate discrimination which is sufficient
to make it invalid."); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963) ("[R]acial classifications are
obviously irrelevant and invidious.") (citations omitted); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 727 (1961) (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding unconstitutional Delaware's "legisla-
tive enactment as authorizing discriminatory classification based exclusively on color."); Garner
v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 184 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Race is an impermissible classi-
fication when it comes to parks or other municipal facilities by reason of the Equal Protection
Clause."); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating a Florida statute that
applied only to a white person and a Negro who habitually occupy the same room at nighttime).
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forms of discrimination were widespread and overt, for instance anti-
miscegenation laws, 30 courts found it unnecessary to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate uses of race since Jim Crow segrega-
tion laws were patently invidious. Because no compelling justification
could be advanced, strict scrutiny review in practice was a formal ex-
ercise-"strict in theory and fatal in fact."3
In response, states eliminated explicit exclusionary racial refer-
ences in their laws and programs over time (although some of those
laws and programs continued to have discriminatory impacts). 32 Af-
firmative action programs thereafter became the only state programs
expressly to mention race.33 Whites filing "reverse discrimination"
suits began to challenge affirmative action and used strict scrutiny as
the weapon to strike down those government programs.3 4 In an ironic
twist, the strict scrutiny standard became automatically "fatal" for
programs designed to advance the interests of historically subordi-
nated "discrete and insular minorities. '35  Formal strict scrutiny re-
view thus faced increasing criticism because of its reflexive striking
down of remedial laws without careful analysis of context, purposes,
and effects.36
30. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In fact, among Jim Crow laws, anti-miscegenation
laws were the last to fall during the civil rights era. See Peter Wallenstein, Freedom: Personal
Liberty and Private Law: Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860s-
1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 371, 435 (1994).
31. Gunther, supra note 5, at 8.
32. See Siegel, supra note 27, at 1131-35; Angela Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and
Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 2002-14 (2000) (describing the
transition of state-sponsored discrimination from overt to subtle).
33. See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Dismantling Civil Rights: Multiracial Resistance and Re-
construction, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 543-50 (2000-2001). But see Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow's
Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107 (2004) (cataloging Jim Crow-like statutes still on the
books, and concluding that much of the statutory effort to evade Brown in the former Confeder-
ate states-which remains on the books-could be used to discriminate on the basis of race at
present).
34. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). "Reverse discrimination" challenges to some affirmative ac-
tion programs were also upheld during this era. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276 (1978).
35. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Dar-
ren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race": The Inversion of Privi-
lege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 615, 637
(2003) (asserting that current equal protection analysis inverts notions of privilege and subordi-
nation, thereby reserving the most exacting level of scrutiny for laws burdening historically privi-
leged groups, as opposed to historically subordinated groups).




B. Movement From "Fatal-in-Fact" Review Towards Contextual
Strict Scrutiny
Rumblings of a more flexible, contextualized version of strict
scrutiny in the Supreme Court's 1995 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena37 decision erupted in the Court's 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger38 ma-
jority opinion. For the first time, the Court embraced a new context-
sensitive form of strict scrutiny analysis-albeit without clear guidance
on its practical operation.
1. Recent Opinions
The Court continues to structure its equal protection analysis
around the established two-part "compelling interest" and "narrow
tailoring" test.39 Yet a strong shift in jurisprudential positions inform-
ing that test can be teased out of recent opinions. In short, a majority
of the Court has taken halting, yet significant, steps toward a transi-
tion from formal "fatal-in-fact" review to contextual strict scrutiny. It
does so by effectively recognizing that "socially constructed racial cat-
egories [are] not equal in status. They are highly contextualized, with
powerful, deeply embedded social and political meanings."4
Long acknowledged as the Court's pivotal swing vote on racial
justice issues, recently departed Justice Sandra Day O'Connor au-
thored the plurality and majority opinions in the Court's recent af-
firmative action cases. In those opinions, she signaled her evolving
role in reshaping strict scrutiny jurisprudence. Her opinions in Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co.,4 Shaw v. Reno,42 Adarand,43 Grutter,44 and
Johnson v. California45 reveal Justice O'Connor's 46-and a majority of
37. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
38. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
39. Professor Robert Post aptly notes, "[w]hether a classification serves a 'compelling' gov-
ernmental interest or is 'narrowly tailored' are questions that must be answered primarily by
reference to the legal precedents of the Court .... The Court can shape [equal protection] con-
troversies ... by manipulating the definition of a 'compelling' state interest or by construing the
meaning of 'narrow tailoring."' Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Forward: Fash-
ioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (2003). It is "no
accident that strict scrutiny doctrine is framed in terms that are opaque to common usage." Id.
40. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution in Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6
(1991). See infra Part III.A. (discussing the concept of "contextual race" in strict scrutiny
analysis).
41. 488 U.S. 469.
42. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
43. 515 U.S. 200.
44. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
45. 543 U.S. 499.
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the Court's-gradual embrace of a more contextual form of strict
scrutiny. In tracing a selection of Justice O'Connor's opinions, a less
formalistic, more nuanced model of strict scrutiny emerges. What the
majority of the Court now says about strict scrutiny reveals a more
sophisticated and realistic conceptualization of race and racial ine-
quality in modern U.S. society.47
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in the 1989 Croson case-in
sharp contrast with Justice Marshall's dissent-showed little willing-
ness to take account of the history of racial group subordination.
48
Instead, she implicitly treated racial groups as fungible and their his-
tory as largely irrelevant to the consideration of individual rights. Jus-
tice O'Connor faulted the City of Richmond for denying:
certain [mainly White] citizens the opportunity to compete for a
fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race.
To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their "personal
rights" to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated
by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of
public decisionmaking.49
Justice O'Connor examined the city's affirmative action in con-
tracting programs without significant regard to history or relevant
group differences, instructing that "[t]he guarantee of equal protec-
tion cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and some-
thing else when applied to a person of another color."5 Justice
O'Connor, therefore, characterized race as "irrelevant."51 Under this
46. Professor Kenneth Karst observes that when it comes to principles of formal colorblind-
ness, Justice O'Connor's opinions illustrate that, "she can take this model or leave it alone." See
Kenneth Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 55 Sup. CT. REV. 357
(2003). In the affirmative action cases in particular, Justice O'Connor's more recent opinions
indicate less willingness to accept the formal strict scrutiny model. See Johnson, 543 U.S. 499; see
infra Part I.
47. How Justice O'Connor's replacement Justice Samuel Alito and former Chief Justice
Rehnquist's replacement Chief Justice John Roberts respond is, of course, an open question.
Significantly, in their recent confirmation hearings, Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts em-
phasized their fealty to stare decisis. See Transcript of U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing
on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the Supreme Court (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html; Transcript
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing On the Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300876.html.
48. See Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989).
49. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493 (1989).
50. Id. at 494 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90); see also
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1992).
51. Croson, 488 U.S at 495. ("[A] watered-down version of equal protection review effec-
tively assures that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the ultimate goal of
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approach to formal strict scrutiny, other than as an extremely narrow
remedy for direct and continuing racial discrimination by a defen-
dant,52 there are no permissible uses of race in government decision-
making. Because all racial groups are fungible, any use of race is
necessarily unlawful discrimination.53
Yet, upon closer examination, somewhat ironic and limited mo-
ments of context informed Justice O'Connor's overridingly formalistic
tone. Looking at the majority-Black composition of the Richmond
City Council, Justice O'Connor found that Blacks were no longer a
discrete and insular minority in need of the judiciary's protection.54
By attempting to explain the relative power of Blacks in city politics,
Justice O'Connor engaged in a limited discussion of racial context.55
In doing so, Justice O'Connor slightly opened the door to affirmative
action, but with a high threshold-in the "extreme case, some form of
narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down
patterns of deliberate exclusion."56
Four years later, Justice O'Connor signaled a further shift from
formal towards contextual strict scrutiny in Shaw v. Reno.57 In ruling
on a voter redistricting challenge, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
opened in largely formalistic tones. Race is an irrelevant factor in
government decisionmaking because, "[r]acial gerrymandering, even
for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial fac-
tions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political sys-
eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human be-
ing's race will never be achieved.") (internal quotations omitted).
52. See id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In my view there is only one circumstance in
which the States may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination': where that is neces-
sary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification.").
53. See Reginald Oh, Re-Mapping Equal Protection Jurisprudence: A Legal Geography of
Race and Affirmative Action, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (2004) (explaining Croson's signifi-
cance as "the way the Court produced and mapped a new social reality of race relations in
America. In the decision, the Court asserted that African Americans had achieved racial parity
with Whites, and as such, that African Americans could no longer rely on a history of racial
discrimination to justify the enactment of affirmative action programs.").
54. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 ("In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of
the population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are held by
blacks. The concern that a political majority wilt more easily act to the disadvantage of a minor-
ity based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not
against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case.") (internal citations omitted).
55. Justice O'Connor, however, omitted the deeper social and historical context of White
racism against Blacks in all aspects of public life that Justice Marshall wove throughout his dis-
sent. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 528-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 509.
57. 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
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tern in which race no longer matters."58 Building upon her moment of
limited context in Croson, however, Justice O'Connor observed that
"[t]his Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking
is impermissible in all circumstances." 59
The majority's discernable shift toward contextual strict scrutiny
emerged in 1995 with its pronouncement in Adarand that the Court
would take relevant differences into account in assessing race-as-a-
factor affirmative action in federal contracting. Strict scrutiny "does
not treat dissimilar race-based decisions as though they were equally
objectionable."60
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor announced that strict
scrutiny accounts for relevant group differences to "distinguish legiti-
mate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmak-
ing."6 1  Justice O'Connor stressed the importance of a searching
review "in order to ferret out classifications in reality malign, but mas-
querading as benign."62 The Court signaled that each racial classifica-
tion would be viewed in light of its particular setting.
Justice O'Connor also disputed the familiar characterization that
strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.63 Rather, the deci-
sion to apply strict scrutiny "says nothing about the ultimate validity
of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court apply-
ing strict scrutiny."64
In Adarand, Justice O'Connor unveiled her evolving socio-histor-
ical view of strict scrutiny-one that allows governments to address
the "lingering effects" of racism. The "unhappy persistence of both
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and govern-
58. Id. The Court derided "impermissible racial stereotypes" where
[a] reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the
same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their
skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the per-
ception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, eco-
nomic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such per-
ceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. Id. at 647.
59. Id. at 642.
60. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995).
61. Id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 ("[W]e adhere to Adarand's teaching
that the very purpose of strict scrutiny is to take such 'relevant differences into account."') (cita-
tions omitted).
62. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reiterating the majority's
viewpoint).
63. Id. at 237.
64. Id. at 230.
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ment is not disqualified from acting in response to it."65 This language
in Adarand highlighted Justice O'Connor's emerging contextual anal-
ysis of racial classifications and opened the door for close examination
of history and current social conditions. Yet, in application, the
Court's majority struck down the affirmative action program in fed-
eral contracting.
Dissenting to the outcome in Adarand, Justice Stevens chided the
majority in its assessment of the facts for ignoring the obvious "differ-
ence between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat."66 For Jus-
tice Stevens, racial groups are not fungible. Racial groups have
differing histories and present-day social and economic circumstances.
Courts, therefore, should not treat "dissimilar race-based decisions as
though they were equally objectionable."67
Building on the contextual foundation established in Adarand,
explicit language from Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg's Grutter and
Gratz opinions solidified the movement by the majority toward a new
contextual strict scrutiny. Writing for the Grutter majority (which in-
cluded Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer), Justice
O'Connor declared that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause."68 Rejecting
formal strict scrutiny, she explained that racial minority status does
matter, because "[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or having
particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's
views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minor-
ity in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still
matters.
'69
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion also evinced a contextual
approach to strict scrutiny review.7" It carefully described differences
in the social situations of minority students attributable to past and
current discrimination.71 Together, the O'Connor and Ginsburg opin-
ions firmly embraced contextual, rather than formal, review of racial
classifications.
65. Id. at 237.
66. Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
68. Grutter v. Bollinger, 593 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 333.
70. See infra Part II.A. (describing the particulars of Justice Ginsburg's embrace of a con-
textual form of strict scrutiny).
71. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[l~t remains the current reality




The opponents of contextual strict scrutiny, too, acknowledged its
emergence. Dissenting in Grutter, Justice Kennedy observed that the
Court's deference to the law school's use of race in its admissions pro-
gram was "antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it."72 The
Court's analysis was "accompanied by a suspension of strict scru-
tiny."73 Despite these pronouncements, Kennedy indicated that he
did not disagree entirely with the majority's heightened scrutiny anal-
ysis-"[t]here is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering
race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity."74
Indeed, Kennedy even acknowledged that in a given "special con-
text"75 race may be taken into consideration.
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist likewise observed that the Court
had shifted towards a more contextual review of racial classifications.
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[b]efore the Court's decision to-
day, [the Court] consistently applied the same strict scrutiny analysis
regardless of the government's purported reason for using race and
regardless of the setting in which race was being used."76 Like Justice
Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the Court's higher level
of deference to government decisionmakers' judgments about the
need for equality measures. Despite the majority's "recit[ation of] the
language of our [previous] strict scrutiny analysis, its application of
that review is unprecedented in its deference."77 At the end of his
dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that the majority's partially
deferential posture fits within the Court's new strict scrutiny analysis:
"The Court, in an unprecedented display of deference under our strict
scrutiny analysis, upholds the Law School's program."78
2. Commentators Recognize a Shift
Commentators from varying political perspectives also acknowl-
edge the Court's discernable shift toward a more race-conscious, con-
text-sensitive strict scrutiny analysis. For example, law and economics
Professor Richard Epstein observes that, "the defenders of the [for-
72. Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The
majority today refuses to be faithful to the settled principle of strict review.").
73. Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (of-
fering his approval of "giving appropriate consideration to race in this one context").
75. Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("We likewise rejected calls to
apply more lenient views based on the particular setting in which race is being used.").
77. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 387 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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mal] color-blind principle regarded the outcome [in Grutter] as a ma-
jor defeat, which for them it indeed was." 79 Professor Guy-Uriel
Charles agrees that, "the Court rejected the argument that the Consti-
tution is colorblind and that classifications based upon race... are per
se unconstitutional.""0
Others have interpreted Grutter's seemingly far-reaching lan-
guage on strict scrutiny as more smoke than fire.8' Professor Barbara
Flagg, for instance, sees Grutter's smoke in language of a new kind of
strict scrutiny, but fails to see the actual fire. 2 The Court's "applica-
tion of strict scrutiny tends to implement a principle of colorblind-
ness, '' 3 rather than a new kind of grounded, racial group awareness.
Other commentators acknowledge that the Court's majority al-
tered traditional, formal strict scrutiny analysis, but perceive the
change to be inadequate. For instance, Professor Pauline Kim is cog-
nizant of a shift, but is also frustrated by what she views as the Court's
continuing reliance on tenets of formal strict scrutiny. 4
79. Richard A. Epstein, Of Same Sex Relationships and Affirmative Action: The Covert Lib-
ertarianism of the United States Supreme Court, 12 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 75, 99 (2004). Professor
Epstein recognizes that formal colorblindness "makes it appear that all racial classifications are
equally suspect and that the direction of the discrimination simply does not matter." Id. at 102.
As Epstein acknowledges, "[tihat conclusion is not sustainable once the attention is placed in-
stead on the institutional matters. There has been no history of black domination in the United
States that would lead inexorably to the conclusion that any racial classifications in their favor
are suspect." Id.
80. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Affirmative Action and Colorblindness from the Original Posi-
tion, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2009, 2010 (2004) ("[T]he Court adopted the right approach in Grutter and
justly rejected the allure of the colorblindness principle."); see also Angelo N. Ancheta, Contex-
tual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy Making, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 21 (2004).
81. See David Kairys, More or Less Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 675, 683 n.56
(2004) ("Grutter did not alter the approach or framework."); Keith R. Walsh, Color-blind Ra-
cism in Grutter and Gratz, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 443 (2004) (reviewing EDUARDO
BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY (2003)).
82. Professor Flagg, who has argued against a jurisprudence of formal colorblindness, posits
that despite some of the majority's language, its opinion in application advances the irrelevance
of race by invoking individualism and personal rights as pivotal concepts. See Barbara J. Flagg,
Diversity Discourses, 78 TUL. L. REV. 827, 839 (2004).
83. Id. at 831. Professor Flagg has provided many compelling insights into race and law in
America. This particular observation, however, offered soon after the Grutter decision, appears
to miss the mark. As this Part later demonstrates, for the Court's majority, contextual strict
scrutiny is not simply a new short-hand for formal colorblindness. Contextual strict scrutiny
does not treat race as "irrelevant." Flagg argues that the Grutter opinion is deeply intertwined
with "images of abstract individualism." Id. at 832. However, as distilled in this Article, the
emerging contextual strict scrutiny directs courts to recognize the relevance of race, without
locking them into a narrow framework of abstract individualism.
84. See Pauline T. Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 9 (2003). Professor
Kim explains that in strictly scrutinizing the Michigan Law School program, the "Grutter Court
took a step away from embracing formal colorblindness as a deciding principle. Nevertheless,
the current structure of equal protection analysis, which the Court's decision in Grutter left in-
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In contrast, other scholars perceive a significant and salutary
shift. Following "Grutter, it is now more apparent that strict scrutiny
is a more flexible and functional inquiry"85 and no longer the fatal-in-
fact, formal strict scrutiny. "Grutter clarified... that the concept of
strict scrutiny as a mechanical and wooden test" was incorrect.8 6
From the post-Grutter cacophony, one point rings clear: formal
strict scrutiny no longer exists, and some form of a contextualized
ends-means analysis has emerged in its place. Neither the courts nor
commentators, however, agree on what the new strict scrutiny looks
like or how it operates. Disaffected Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy,
for instance, have voiced serious concern that the new strict scrutiny
will amount to a green light for all race-as-a-factor programs. 87 Justice
Kennedy warned that the Grutter majority, "in a review that [was]
nothing short of perfunctory, accept[ed] the University of Michigan
Law School's assurances that its admissions process [met] with consti-
tutional requirements"-the judicial equivalent of a rubber stamp.
The Court's language in Grutter and Johnson v. California89 , how-
ever, and its invalidation of Michigan's undergraduate affirmative ac-
tion program in Gratz, reveal these fears to be unfounded or at least
premature. Indeed, post-Grutter and Gratz, lower courts have em-
ployed contextual strict scrutiny-albeit with some uncertainty-both
to uphold and to invalidate race-conscious programs.9 °
tact, lends particular weight to the notion of colorblindness." Id. at 11. This is so because, under
traditional strict scrutiny review, race is singled-out for the most heightened standard of review.
Id. "By treating race as exceptional, the Court's jurisprudence suggests that any use of race is
inherently wrong, regardless of the purpose, context, or effects of the policy in question." Id. at
11-12. Professor Kim also observes that "the multiple opinions in Grutter and Gratz reveal deep
tensions within the Court about the legitimacy of race-conscious policies and the meaning of
equal protection." Id. at 9. Kim explains that "conflict over the notion of colorblindness" is at
the heart of the Justices' disagreement. Id. at 10.
85. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, In Defense of Deference, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 133, 166 (2004).
86. Id. at 166.
87. Dissenting in Grutter, Justice Kennedy found "regrettable the Court's important hold-
ing.., a suspension of the strict scrutiny which was the predicate of allowing race to be consid-
ered." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). According to
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist, although the majority "recite[d] the language of our strict scru-
tiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its deference." Id. at 380 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Thomas derided the majority's application of the standard of
review as "antithetical to strict scrutiny." Id. at 362 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 388-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
89. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
90. Contextual strict scrutiny will be applied to uphold what are determined to be meritori-
ous programs that address real world inequalities. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Washington, Law
School, 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding University's use of race in law school admis-
sions); Petit v. Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding the City of Chicago proved a
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Because of this uncertainty9" and the significance of the stakes, in
the next section, we distill language from various opinions before and
through Grutter and offer an analytical method for operationalizing
the new contextual strict scrutiny.
II. A METHOD FOR OPERATIONALIZING CONTEXTUAL
STRICT SCRUTINY
The 2003 Grutter Court profoundly marked the legal landscape:
"[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action
under the Equal Protection Clause."'9 2 Strict scrutiny "is designed to
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and
sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker
for the use of race in that particular context."
9 3
compelling operational need for a diverse police department and satisfied narrow tailoring
where procedures minimized harm to members of any racial group).
Conversely, contextual strict scrutiny will be applied to invalidate programs that do not
satisfy the rigorous ends-means analysis. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidat-
ing University's use of race in undergraduate admissions because it was not narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling state interest in diversity); Cavalier v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 403 F.3d
246 (5th Cir. 2005) (invalidating magnet school's race-based admissions policy because it was not
narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of past segregation).
91. The "uncertainty" referenced here concerns the analytical method for applying the new
strict scrutiny. The Court's earlier uncertainty about whether strict scrutiny applied at all in
affirmative action cases, see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), was
resolved in Croson and Adarand.
92. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added). See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
343-44 (1960) ("[I]n dealing with claims ... which derive content by an interpretive process of
inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the con-
crete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant
controlling facts.").
93. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added). The Court in Grutter and Justice Ginsburg in
Gratz undertook a careful examination of the classifications in context. See id. at 330 (recogniz-
ing that the Law School's admissions program fosters "cross-racial understanding," helps elimi-
nate racial stereotypes, and encourages minorities and non-minorities to better understand each
other); id. at 333 (acknowledging current racial conditions by noting that "[j]ust as growing up in
a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's
views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own,
in which race unfortunately still matters"); Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. and the American Civil Liberties Union, at 3-4, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) ("Racial segregation and isolation continue to be a menace in this
society, producing and perpetuating sharp disparities in the quality of life and opportunities for
advancement of African Americans. Their manifestation in the continued scourge of residential
segregation leave institutions of higher education as one of the few venues for meaningful cross-
racial interaction.").
Justice Ginsburg cited numerous historical and empirical studies and articles for her basic
proposition that "[i]n the wake of a system of racial caste only recently ended, large disparities
endure." Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quota-
tions and citation omitted). Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotia-
tions and Estimates of its Cause, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 109 (1995) (noting that prejudice and bias still
exists in routine consumer transactions such as purchasing a vehicle); James E. Ryan, Schools,
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The method we proffer here for assessing how context matters in
strict scrutiny review is comprised of four analytical inquiries. The
first explores group histories as they shape current racial conditions
informing the challenged initiative. The second assesses whether the
initiative is designed to promote group inclusion rather than exclu-
sion, particularly in situations where a group historically has been ex-
cluded by law and social practice. The third query asks whether even
an intended inclusionary program is rooted in harmful stereotypes.
These first three inquiries are particularly useful in deciding if the gov-
ernment's interest is "compelling." The final assessment focuses on
the appropriateness of an added measure of judicial respect to be ac-
corded the government actor's chosen means for achieving inclusion-
ary goals in light of history and current conditions.
A. Contextual Strict Scrutiny Takes Serious Account of the Racial
Context of the Specific Classification
1. Racial Group History as it Relates to the Racial Classification
Strict scrutiny analysis now considers context by meaningfully ex-
amining racial group history in relation to current social and economic
conditions supporting racial classifications.94 An example of this kind
Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999) (finding that African American and Hispanic
schoolchildren are often educated in less adequate institutions compared to their non-minority
counterparts); see, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 2002, p. 368 (2002) (Table 562) (noting the disproportionate levels of unemploy-
ment by race); U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Poverty in the United States: 2000,
p. 291 (2001) (Table A) (noting the high poverty rates of minorities). Justice Ginsburg also
acknowledged the importance of recalling the racial group history of African Americans when
dealing with present-day problems, citing an article by Professor Stephen L. Carter. See Gratz,
539 U.S. at 301 (citing Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420,
433-34 (1988) ("To pretend ... that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as the issue in
Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present doesn't exist."). Addition-
ally, Justice Ginsburg relied on empirical evidence for the proposition that in "any admissions
process where applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly out-
number minority applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly
diminish the odds of admission facing white applicants." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selec-
tive Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002)).
94. Contextual strict scrutiny reflects what historian Eric Foner describes as the continuing
significance of the historic memory and current reality of racial inequality. See Expert Report of
Eric Foner, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (No. 97-75321), available
at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/foner.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2005)
("In part because of historic memory, and in part because of current reality, race continues to
affect outlook, perception, and experience."); see also Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto,
Collective Memory, History, and Social Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2000) (describing how




of analysis, pre-Grutter, is Justice Marshall's dissent in Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co." Marshall detailed the "disgraceful history" of race
in Richmond as it related to the city's contractor set-aside ordinance.96
Richmond's "deliberate diminution of black residents' voting rights,
resistance to school desegregation, and publicly sanctioned housing
discrimination"97 collectively generated the need for city intervention
in the form of the contractor set-aside legislation. More specifically,
Justice Marshall catalogued the history of African American exclusion
from city contracting to set the contextual foundation for the ordi-
nance.98 It was only "against this backdrop of documented .. .dis-
crimination" that Richmond's program could be properly
understood. 99
By contrast, the formal strict scrutiny approach tended to ignore
racial group histories and thereby to miss stark inequalities."° The
majority opinions in Croson largely ignored the history of African
Americans in Richmond, 101 the former capital of the Confederacy, in
order to find that the city initiative failed strict scrutiny. Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion discounted the city's "sorry history" by
disconnecting it from the city initiative and then declaring it legally
irrelevant "standing alone."' 2 While "there is no doubt that the sorry
history of both private and public discrimination in this country has
contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this ob-
servation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the
awarding of public contracts in Richmond, Virginia."103
95. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 528-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall found "deep irony in second-
guessing Richmond's judgment on this point. As much as any municipality in the United States,
Richmond knows what racial discrimination is; a century of decisions by this and other federal
courts has richly documented the city's disgraceful history of public and private racial discrimina-
tion." Id. at 529.
97. Id. at 544 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 534-35. "[N]ot a single person who testified before the city council denied that
discrimination in Richmond's construction industry had been widespread." Id. Specifically,
Richmond's program was a response to "the general conduct in the construction industry in this
area, and the State and around the nation... in which race discrimination and exclusion on the
basis of race is widespread." Id. at 535 n.5.
99. Id. at 530 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Ross, supra note 48.
100. Contextual strict scrutiny considers that "[the Court's] jurisprudence ranks race a 'sus-
pect' category, 'not because race is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is
one which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial
inequality."' Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968)).
101. See generally Robert Pratt, Simple Justice Denied: The Supreme Court's Retreat from
School Desegregation in Richmond, Virginia, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 709 (1993); Ross, supra note 48.




Concurring, Justice Scalia described affirmative action as a "deci-
sion-making process infected with racial bias."1 °4 In addition to ignor-
ing racial group history in Richmond, Scalia relied on racial fungibility
to justify striking down the city's program. "The relevant proposition
is not that it was blacks or Jews, or Irish who were discriminated
against, but that it was individual men and women, 'created equal'
who were discriminated against.' 0 5 Differing group histories of sub-
ordination and present racial conditions were moot in Scalia's a-con-
textual formulation. 10
6
In a contested, post-Grutter case, the Fifth Circuit's majority and
dissent dueled at the threshold over the relevance of racial group his-
tory to the court's strict scrutiny analysis. In Cavalier v. Caddo Par-
rish School Board,1 °7 a divided Fifth Circuit panel held the school
district's magnet school race-as-a-factor admissions policy unconstitu-
tional. The majority generally acknowledged and then expressly de-
clared irrelevant the long history of racial segregation in Louisiana
schools that had earlier led to a consent decree ordering racial admis-
sions targets as a remedy for specific past acts of racial discrimina-
tion."0 8 Upon declaring the history of exclusion towards African
Americans irrelevant and because court supervision of the consent de-
cree had ended, the majority found no compelling evidence to support
the city's racial integration component of the admissions policy for the
magnet school.10 9
104. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Id.; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be
made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or debtor
race."). Justice Scalia has long countenanced the use of race only in the "most dire emergency
situations," which, in his view, are apparently not tied to histories of racial group oppression.
See Linda S. Greene, The Constitution and Racial Equality After Gratz and Grutter, 43 WASH-
BURN L.J. 253, 272 (2004).
106. See Ross, supra note 48, at 404; Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law From 1954 to
1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction, Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note
21, at 285.
107. 403 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2005).
108. Id. at 248-50, The consent decree had its roots in a 1965 lawsuit filed by seven Black
children against the school district. Id. at 248. In 1981, the consent decree directed the school
system to desegregate, and called for the establishment of three new magnet schools with a
"projected racial enrollment." Id. at 249.
109. Id. at 258-61. "There is no evidence on the record of current segregation within the
school system ... or vestiges of past discrimination." Id. The majority admitted in a footnote
that "[alt oral argument, counsel for the School Board suggested two vestiges of past segrega-
tion: the fact that the school system still has several one-race schools and the test-score disparity
between white and black students. As this 'evidence' is not in the record and was suggested for
the first time at oral argument, it is not properly before us." Id. at 259 n.14.
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Judge Weiner's dissent chastised the majority for its largely ahis-
torical strict scrutiny analysis,' declaring racial history crucial to a
realistic understanding of the issues. His dissent focused on the school
board's comprehensive and continuing efforts "generally to eradicate
all vestiges of past segregation.""' When viewed in this historical
framework, the "school board's discretionary decision to retain its
magnet school admissions policy as an integral tool in the Board's
ongoing struggle to achieve its [originally] court-ordered, yet-unreal-
ized goal of total desegregation easily passes our scrutiny.""'  Judge
Weiner observed that the cessation of court supervision of magnet
schools under the consent decree "is not the equivalent of a court dec-
laration that the persistent vestiges of more than a century of school
segregation have ceased to plague a substantial majority of Caddo's
minority school students."' t 3 The court's "review of the Caddo Mag-
net admissions policy must take into account the timing and history of
that policy and the circumstances under which the school district
operates."'"
4
Croson and Cavalier both illustrate the difference between for-
mal and contextual strict scrutiny. The latter approach, reflected in
Justice Marshall's and Judge Weiner's opinions and now sanctioned by
the Court's majority, examines the linkage of the historical back-
ground of the racial groups involved to the specific racial classification
at issue. This linkage is significant. Mounting scholarly work identi-
fies the causal relationship between group histories of racial discrimi-
nation and current social and economic disparities that inform a need
for modern race-conscious measures. 115
110. See id. at 261-64 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 261-63 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
112. Id.; see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyer-
ing Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 821, 821-27 (1997) (describing a
similar challenge by Chinese Americans to an early school desegregation order).
113. Cavalier, 403 F.3d at 261-63 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Weiner, J., dissenting).
115. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Af-
firmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 697-706 (2004) (outlining the causal
connection between racial disparities and past discrimination); id. at 704 ("Given the history of
discrimination against blacks in this country, the persistence of substantial disparities between
whites and blacks is not surprising.") Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity and
the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 939, 967 (1997) (discussing past and current exam-
ples of housing and employment discrimination as the source of current inequality for middle-
class African Americans); infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the importance of social science studies
and data gathering to "racial realism").
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For instance, during the Grutter 16 trial, historian John Hope
Franklin testified about crucial racial matters that would be deemed
irrelevant by a formal strict scrutiny approach. He described in depth
African Americans' stark history of educational inequalities 17 and
noted that "recent challenges to race-sensitive admissions programs
were the latest in a long line of improvisational maneuvers in further-
ance of segregation. 1
18
Additionally, amicus curiae offered evidence on prominent law
schools in California and Texas showing that, consistent with Profes-
sor Franklin's observation, eliminating race-conscious admissions poli-
cies at law schools inevitably re-segregates those institutions.11 9
Dismantling race-as-a-factor admissions policies "means turning back
the clock on more than three decades of progress in legal education
made possible by the Civil Rights Movement.
12 0
As one commentator aptly concluded, "[n]o nation can enslave a
race of people for hundreds of years, set them free bedraggled and
penniless, pit them without assistance in a hostile environment against
privileged victimizers, and then reasonably expect the gap between
the heirs of the two groups to narrow. Lines, begun parallel and left
alone, can never touch. '1 21 Contextual strict scrutiny acknowledges
the significance of racial group history and directs courts to seriously
examine that history as it relates to racial conditions informing a par-
ticular classification.
2. Current Racial Conditions as They Relate to Racial
Classification
The link between history and current conditions provides key
context for assessing potentially racially exclusionary actions or at-
tempts to address their consequences. For Professor Alan Freeman
this judicial inquiry "focuses on the persistence of conditions tradi-
tionally associated" with racially discriminatory practices-exclusion
116. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
117. Grutter amicus brief, supra note 7, at 13.
118. Id. (quoting John Hope Franklin Transcript, at 155 91 4-11, in Grutter v. Bollinger, No.
97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
119. Id. at 13-14 (citing William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A
History of African American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950-2000,
19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2003)).
120. Grutter amicus brief, supra note 7, at 15; see generally CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III &
MARl J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997).
121. RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 74 (2000).
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from jobs, neighborhoods, schools, politics and government
contracts.
12 2
During the Grutter trial, Professor Thomas Sugrue presented evi-
dence on the overwhelming level of residential and educational segre-
gation currently experienced by African Americans.1 23  In uplifting
schools as rare sites of communal interaction, Professor Sugrue con-
cluded that "there are unfortunately few places in American society
where people of different backgrounds interact, learn from each
other, and struggle to understand their differences and discover their
commonality.' ' 24
Drawing upon this evidence, Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Gratz
highlighted contemporary forms of racial exclusion-a distinctly une-
qual racial playing field:
Unemployment, poverty, and access to health care vary dispropor-
tionately by race. Neighborhoods and schools remain racially di-
vided. African-American and Hispanic children are all too often
educated in poverty-stricken and underperforming institutions.
Adult African-Americans and Hispanics generally earn less than
whites with equivalent levels of education. Equally credentialed job
applicants receive different receptions depending on their race. Ir-
rational prejudice is still encountered in real estate markets and
consumer transactions.
25
Justice Ginsburg's dissent extended beyond mere recognition of
contemporary forms of exclusion. It also identified the roots of exclu-
sionary barriers: "Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that
must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever
genuinely to become this country's law and practice."' 26
Formal colorblindness in strict scrutiny review largely ignores this
kind of evidence of continuing discrimination in America and result-
122. Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, in THE POLITICS OF LAW
125 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1991).
123. See Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (No. 97-75321), available at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/
sugrutoc.html (last visited April 4, 2005).
124. Grutter amicus brief, supra note 7, at 17 (citing Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue,
Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97-75321 (E.D. Mich.), Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich.)).
125. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 300 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations
and footnotes omitted).
126. Id. at 300-01 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of unconscious or
implicit bias, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995);
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005).
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ing racial inequalities.127 In the words of Professor Freeman, it as-
sumes that all racial groups are now "fungible"-they are
interchangeable in terms of current racial conditions. 28 The plaintiff
in Grutter advanced a formal colorblindness argument, and in doing so
denied one aspect of social reality that is critical to thorough constitu-
tional analysis: "race continues to have a profound impact on the dis-
tribution of opportunity and justice in America." '129
Formal colorblindness generally assumes a level present-day ra-
cial playing field, making current racial group conditions irrelevant.13 °
Racial group members all have equal prospects of achieving the
American dream-only individual talent and initiative matter.
This syllogism is appealing in its simplicity. Contextual strict
scrutiny, however, rejects it. It fails to reflect hard racial realities.
While America has become more racially diverse, the 2000 census in-
dicated that "[our] 'nation's inner cities are more segregated now than
they were 50 years ago' during the era of official segregation.""13 A
massive study by the J. Russell Sage Foundation at the new millen-
127. Advocates of formal colorblindness in strict scrutiny review argue that racial history
could only be relevant to finding the specific perpetrator who committed specific acts of discrim-
ination against the plaintiff. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimina-
tion Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MiNN. L. REV. 1049, 1066 (1978). By
"abstracting racial discrimination into a myth-world where all problems of race... are fungible,
the color-blind theory turns around and denies concrete demands of blacks with the argument
that to yield to such demands would be impossible since every other ethnic group would be
entitled to make the same demand[s]." Id.
129. Grutter amicus brief, supra note 7, at 17; see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264
(1986) ("114 years after the close of the War Between the States . . . racial and other forms of
discrimination still remain a factor of life, in the administration of justice as in our society as a
whole.") (citations omitted).
130. See infra Part III.A.1.
131. See Leland Ware, Strict Scrutiny, Affirmative Action, and Academic Freedom: The Uni-
versity of Michigan Cases, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2097, 2113 (2004) (citing Leland Ware & Antoine
Allen, The Geography of Discrimination: Hypersegregation, Isolation and the Fragmentation
Within the African-American Community, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 69 (Lee A. Daniels
ed., 2002)). "Studies conducted regularly by the federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development, by academic researchers, and by private organizations, all demonstrate conclu-
sively that today's residential segregation stems not from the private choices of individual fami-
lies but from decades of official segregation and the persistence of unlawful discriminatory
practices." Id. at 2113-14; see also Brief of the American Sociological Association, et al., as
Amici Curiae, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241):
Blacks living in Detroit, New York, and Chicago today are almost as segregated from
whites as were blacks living in South Africa under apartheid. More than seventy per-
cent of black children in the United States attend schools that are majority nonwhite.
For Latino children, segregation is also pronounced: seventy-six percent attend schools
that are majority nonwhite. These segregated schools are generally inferior in staffing,




nium-covering 8,600 individuals and 3,200 businesses-found signifi-
cant continuing and often-subtle workplace discrimination in
America.' 32 African Americans were the primary targets of discrimi-
nation because of their race.133 As historians John Hope Franklin and
Alfred Moss explain, the end of the twentieth century "saw height-
ened economic deprivation and social problems" in Black communi-
ties.13 4  Poverty and social problems, exacerbated by racial
discrimination, also persist in Latino, Asian American and Native
132. See Russell Sage Foundation, Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, available at http://
www.russellsage.org/programs/proj-reviews/multicity.shtml (last visited March 31, 2005).
133. See id.
134. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A His-
TORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (8th ed. 2000). Statistical data overwhelmingly shows "chronic
unemployment, rampant violence, drug addiction, HIV infection and AIDS, soaring homicide
rates for young black males, high levels of illegitimate births to young black females, and public
school systems overwhelmed by all these problems." Id. at 551-52. See STEPHEN STEINBERG,
TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL INJUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY
212-13 (1995) (citing statistics and observing that in terms of major social indicators "a far less
sanguine picture emerges-one of persistent and even widening gaps between blacks and whites
in incomes and living standards").
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American communities in varying locales across the country.135 The
racial playing field remains sharply tilted.136
135. Among Hispanics, poverty increased from 8.6 million in 2002 to 9.1 million in 2003. See
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Income Stable, Poverty Up, Numbers of Americans
With and Without Health Insurance Rise, Census Bureau Reports, available at http://www.cen-
sus.govPress-Release/www/releases/archives/income-wealthl002484.htm (last visited April 6,
2005). In the same study, poverty of those who indicated Asian as their only race rose from 1.2
million in 2002 to 1.4 million in 2003. Id. "Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong are
amongst the poorest Asian ethnic groups in this country." Harvey Gee, Expanding The Civil
Rights Dialogue in an Increasingly Diverse America: A Review of Frank Wu's Yellow: Race in
America Beyond Black and White, 20 TOURO L. REV. 425, 474 (2004) (citing A Report of the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Civil Rights Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s, at 16
(1992)). Consequently, "there are a disproportionate number of Southeast Asians on public as-
sistance" and they are the "fastest growing segment of welfare recipients and have the highest
welfare dependency rates of any ethnic or racial group." Id. at 474-75. Between 1990-2000, the
poverty level for Native Americans living in the Northern Plains, coastal Alaska, the Southwest
and Oklahoma was 40.7%. See Calvin L. Beale, The Ethno/Racial Context of Poverty in Rural
and Small Town America, POVERTY & RACE (March/April 2003), available at http://www.prrac.
org/full text.php?text id=804&item_id=7806&newsletterid=67&header=Poverty+%2F+Wel-
fare (last visited April 6, 2005) (research conducted in non-metro counties). In 1990, 36.1% of
Native American families lived below the poverty line. See Brenda Donelan, The Unique Cir-
cumstances of Native American Juveniles Under Federal Supervision, 63-DEC FED. PROBATION
68, 70 tbl. 2 (1999). "With the exception of Hispanics, American Indians are the least likely of all
minority groups to graduate from high school or college." Id. at 70.
On the importance of transcending the Black-White race paradigm, see Mari Matsuda, Be-
yond, and Not Beyond, Black and White: Deconstruction Has a Politics, in CROSSROADS, DIREC-
TIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 393 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); John 0.
Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real World of Race: An Essay for "Naked People
Longing to Swim Free," 15 LAW & INEQ. 25 (1997); Joe R. Feagin, White Supremacy and Mexican
Americans: Rethinking the "Black-White Paradigm," 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 959 (2002); Chris K.
lijima, The Era of We Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Asian Pacific American Identity
and Reflections in the Critique of the Black/White Paradigm, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47
(1997); Rachel F. Moran, What if Latinos Really Mattered in the Public Policy Debate?, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1315 (1997); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm and The "Normal Sci-
ence" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black
Nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995).
136. African American socioeconomic conditions, for instance, continue to reflect stark ine-
qualities. The poverty rate for blacks in 2001 was 22.7%, higher than the rates for people of all
other racial and ethnic groups. Bernadette D. Proctor & Joseph Dalaker, U.S. Dep't. of Com-
merce, Poverty in the United States: 2001 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2002pubs/p60- 219.pdf.
Racial minorities continue to face discrimination in employment, housing, and access to
health care. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Equal Employment Opportunity: Displacement
Rates, Unemployment Spells, and Reemployment Wages by Race, GAO/HEHS-94-229FS (Sept.
1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/152533.pdf. In 2000, African American appli-
cants were more than twice as likely to be turned down for a conventional mortgage loan as
White applicants. Thomas Grillo, ACORN Finds Lending Disparities Continue, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 6, 2001, at El. Latinos were rejected almost 50% more often than Whites. Id. "There are
continuing [statistical] disparities in the burden of illness and death experienced by African
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders, and American Indians/
Alaska Natives, as compared to the U.S. population as a whole." U.S. Dep't. of Health and
Human Services, HHS Fact Sheet: Minority Health Disparities At a Glance (July 12, 2004),
available at http://raceandhealth.hhs.gov/glance.htm.
In education, many public schools are segregated along racial and ethnic lines, with marked
differences in the quality of education. See Erica Frankenberg et al., A Multiracial Society with
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As Justice Ginsburg expressed in Gratz, contemporary forms of
exclusion, and their historical sources, are integral to understanding
present-day racial conditions as the foundation for government initia-
tives. Formal colorblindness ignores them. Contextual strict scrutiny
examines them closely.
B. In Taking "Relevant Differences" into Account, Contextual
Strict Scrutiny Distinguishes Classifications Designed to
Promote Inclusion from Those Designed to Perpetuate
Historical Exclusion
While taking racial group history and current racial conditions
into consideration, contextual strict scrutiny closely examines the gov-
ernment initiative in terms of relevant differences. Unlike its formal
counterpart, contextual strict scrutiny distinguishes classifications de-
signed to promote inclusion from those designed to exclude groups
from participation in important realms of the American polity.
Barbara Grutter argued that the Supreme Court should treat all
racial classifications identically, without considering the "entrenched
and systematic disadvantage to African Americans and other racial
minorities." '137 She recalled the words of the NAACP's Robert Carter
in Brown v. Board of Education:.38 that "no state has any authority
under the equal protection clause ... to use race as a factor in afford-
ing educational opportunities among its citizens."' 39 By employing
Carter's words from the historic school desegregation cases of the
1950s to bolster her argument against affirmative action in 2003, Grut-
ter ripped Carter's statement out of its context and distorted its actual
meaning. She did so by ignoring the stark difference "between a clas-
sification that systematically excludes African Americans as a group
(which Carter was opposing) and one that addresses the exclusionary
effects of long-standing racial discrimination in education (which
Carter was not then addressing, but would have supported). '140
Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? (2003), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (reporting that the desegregation of African
American students has receded to levels not seen in the previous three decades).
137. See Grutter amicus brief, supra note 7, at 6 (characterizing Grutter's argument).
138. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139. Grutter Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 6 (citing Brief for the Petitioner, Grutter v. Bol-
linger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), at 18).
140. Id. at 6-7. See Robert L. Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF
BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 21 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
[VOL. 49:241
Contextual Strict Scrutiny
Grutter's approach thus ignored Carter's underlying rationale
and the racial conditions that made his statement compelling-contin-
uing legalized racial apartheid in America. By equating efforts to
remedy the continuing effects of group-based discrimination with ef-
forts designed to further exclude traditionally subordinated racial
groups, Grutter aimed to erase from legal consideration the continu-
ing institutionalized disadvantage of many racial minorities.1'4  Her
formal colorblind approach to strict scrutiny would automatically
strike down all racial classifications without careful examination of
current racial conditions. 42
By contrast, contextual strict scrutiny now expressly acknowl-
edges that not all racial classifications are the same. 4 3 It distinguishes
legislation and administrative programs developed for the purpose of
fostering equality in light of historical racism and current conditions of
racial inequality from those programs designed to exclude "discrete
and insular minorities" from full participation in the polity.1" Federal
courts have recognized that the former type of legislation, unlike the
latter, may serve significant and legitimate governmental objectives.1 45
In a significant post-Grutter case, outside of the affirmative action
context, the Court reconfirmed the role of "relevant differences" in
141. See Grutter amicus brief, supra note 7, at 7-8. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no moral or constitutional equiva-
lence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradi-
cate racial subordination.").
142. See Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 55 Sup.
CT. REV. 357 (2003) (analyzing the model of "formal racial neutrality").
In this tunnel vision[,] a race-conscious remedy-one aimed at redressing the myriad
corruptions of public life produced by the stigma of caste-is itself a transgression of
formal neutrality, for it alters the equilibrium of the status quo. In other words, the
mode of formal racial neutrality, much in vogue during the years of the Rehnquist
Court, is a recipe for civil rights deregulation.
Id. (emphases added).
143. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Consti-
tution instructs all who act for the government that they may not 'deny to any person ... the
equal protection of the laws.' Amdt. 14, § 1. In implementing this equality instruction, as I see it,
government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclu-
sion."). See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked
with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects have
been extirpated.").
144. The Court as a whole has acknowledged that government programs designed to pro-
mote equality are different from those motivated by prejudice. Justice Stevens emphasized the
need for courts to differentiate between invidious discrimination, which he characterized as an
"engine of oppression," and "benign" legislation which stems from a "desire to foster equality."
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




strict scrutiny analysis. In Johnson v. California,t4 6 the Court reiter-
ated that the reason for strict scrutiny, is that "[r]acial classifications
raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose." '147
Analyzing California's policy of temporarily segregating prisoners
based on their race, the Court again acknowledged that not all uses of
race are the same. Justice O'Connor explained that "[p]risons are
dangerous places, and the special circumstances they present may jus-
tify racial classifications in some contexts. Such circumstances can be
considered in applying strict scrutiny, which is designed to take rele-
vant differences into account."'14 8 Johnson thus recognized judicial
competence to draw these kinds of distinctions and apply the evolving
strict scrutiny standard "within constitutionally prescribed limits." '149
Similarly, in Grutter, the Court determined that the University of
Michigan Law School's use of limited racial criteria in selecting stu-
dents from historically excluded groups promoted inclusion rather
than perpetuated exclusion. Specifically, the Court found that the
Law School's use of racial criteria advanced the inclusion of "talented
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all mem-
bers of [America's] heterogeneous society may participate in the edu-
cational institutions that provide the training and education necessary
to succeed in America. ,150
C. Contextual Strict Scrutiny Evaluates Whether Inclusionary
Initiatives are Actually Motivated by Hidden Racial
Prejudice or Harmful Stereotypes.
Instances may arise where seemingly well-intentioned govern-
ment initiatives are actually motivated by subtle racial prejudice or
146. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
147. Id. at 505. The Court also reaffirmed the importance of the context in which the gov-
ernment used the racial classification. The Court explained that "[in the prison context, when
the government's power is at its apex, we think that searching judicial review of racial classifica-
tions is necessary to guard against invidious discrimination." Id. at 511.
148. Id. at 515.
149. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). The Adarand Court implicitly acknowl-
edged its competence to take relevant racial group differences into account in order to "distin-
guish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking." Adarand, 515
U.S. at 228; see also, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 ("[Wle adhere to Adarand's teaching that the very
purpose of strict scrutiny is to take such 'relevant differences into account."') (citations omitted).
See Adarand v. Slater, 228 F.3d at 1198.
150. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33. The Law School's admissions program promoted inclusion,
which the Court found significant. "Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be
realized." Id. at 332.
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stereotypes. The Adarand majority stressed the importance of a
searching review "in order to ferret out classifications in reality ma-
lign, but masquerading as benign ' 151 in order to assure that there "is
little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegiti-
mate racial prejudice or stereotype. 1 52 Justice Ginsburg's dissent af-
firmed that point in recalling the Court's prior failures to unearth
negative stereotyping underlying paternalistic sex-based
classifications.1 5
3
Ginsburg later also recognized that beyond well-meaning stere-
otyping, there exist more invidious forms of unconscious stereotyp-
ing.154 Expanding social science research shows that unacknowledged
stereotypes sometimes inform decisionmakers' discriminatory ac-
151. 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reiterating the majority's viewpoint).
152. Id. at 226; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("The mere assertion of a laudable governmental purpose . . . should not immunize a race-
conscious measure from careful judicial inspection.").
153. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg cites two cases where
the Court did not rigorously scrutinize the use of sex-based classifications: Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57, 60 (1961) (upholding women's "privilege" of automatic exemption from jury duty);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) ("protecting" women by barring them from employment
as bartenders). This is consistent with Justice Ginsburg's early work illustrating that laws de-
signed to grant benefits to women (based on stereotypical assumptions about their roles in soci-
ety) served to perpetuate those stereotypes, if not examined carefully. See Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813,
821 (1978); see also Sidney Buchanan, Affirmative Action: The Many Shades of Justice, 39 Hous.
L. REV. 149, 156 (2002) (noting the existence of "paternalistic stereotyping," which assumes that
women are considered "unfit" for particular roles in society); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism
and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387, 393 (1993)
(discussing how "the theme of feminism as being victimization dominates popular culture").
154. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 300-01 ("Bias both conscious and unconscious, re-
flecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if
equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country's law and
practice.") (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274).
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tions. 55 Despite some initial reluctance, 56 courts are now generally
receptive to analyzing underlying governmental motives.1 57
155. In California, judges were criticized for excluding Mexican Americans from grand jury
service. When challenged, the judges indicated that they were searching for well-qualified jurors
to assemble a strong, viable grand jury. They also denied any discriminatory intent. See Ian F.
Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination,
109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721-22 (2000) (discussing "institutional racism" in California Superior
Courts) [hereinafter Lopez, Institutional Racism]. The detailed research of Professor Haney-
Lopez nevertheless revealed hidden racial stereotypes underlying at least some of the judges'
exclusionary decisions. Haney-Lopez illustrates this theory by analyzing the "East L.A." and
"Biltmore 6" cases, between the years 1968 and 1970: "While the record reveals in stark numbers
the near total exclusion of Mexican Americans from service on grand juries in Los Angeles over
the decade preceding these cases, each judge testified that he harbored no intention to discrimi-
nate." Id.; see also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE
(2003).
On unconscious racism, see generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). On cognitive bias,
see Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Ac-
tion, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1995); see also Tanya K. Hernandez, An Exploration of the Efficacy of Class-Based
Approaches to Racial Justice: The Cuban Context, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1137 (2000)
(discussing the Cuban government's attempts to "whiten" its population and the "interconnec-
tions" between race and class); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American
Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2001) (discussing
the "racing" of Arab Americans and Muslims by the U.S. government and portraying such
groups as terrorists and a threat to national security); Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Pre-
mise in Native American Law and Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts, 1 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 325, 325 (1998) (explaining that non-Indians view Indians in a dual role, as "Savage Sin-
ners" and "Redskinned Redeemers"); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1575 (2002) (describing the U.S. government's use of racial profiling against persons who
appear Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim).
156. See Siegel, supra note 27, at 1132-33. Siegel observes that in the years after Brown, legal
scholars suggested that "it was inappropriate for judges to inquire into the motives of legislators
in determining whether statutes comported with constitutional requirements." Id. Siegel ac-
knowledges that courts have since departed from this viewpoint. See id. at 1133-34 (describing
the Court's commitment to motive review following Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
157. See Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("A number of courts
have recognized that subjective decision-making allows for subtle biases or unconscious stere-
otyping to affect selection processes."). In Chin, the District Court cited several cases in which
courts examined "motivations" of government actors in connection with racial discrimination
claims. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is
by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive
minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of
guilt or innocence."); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that
"racial stereotypes often infect our decision-making processes only subconsciously"); Bush v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1993) (evidence that employer's sub-
jective determinations "reflected unconscious racial bias"); United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d
820, 826-28 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that juror's area of residence was not a valid racially-neutral
justification for peremptory challenge because court found it to be "a stereotypical racial rea-
son"); EEOC v. Inland Marine, 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855
(1984) (citations omitted) (observing that some subjective selection processes, "though harmless
in appearance, may hide subconscious [discriminatory] attitudes"); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ.
of California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (where decision is "highly subjective"
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Contextual strict scrutiny thus, in part, ascertains whether seem-
ingly ameliorative classifications are actually motivated by prejudice
or harmful stereotypes.' 58 For example, by strictly scrutinizing the
University of Michigan Law School's reasons for wanting to admit a
"critical mass" of minorities, the Grutter Court considered whether
the law school's reasons were motivated by improper stereotyping:
The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on any
belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express
some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue. To the con-
trary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part
of the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with
only token numbers of minority students. 15
9
In making this assessment and finding that the Law School's ef-
forts were in part directed toward breaking down harmful stereotypes,
Ginsburg recognized that, with informed assistance, 160 courts are com-
petent to determine whether apparently inclusionary racial classifica-
tions are grounded on negative racial stereotypes.
D. Contextual Strict Scrutiny Reflects a Greater Degree of
Judicial Respect to Government Initiatives Designed to
Promote Equality.
Contextual strict scrutiny examines racial group history, current
racial conditions, and relevant differences, and ascertains that the gov-
ernment initiative is not motivated by hidden racial prejudice or based
courts should "scrutinize attitudes and motivation" to determine if discriminatory stereotypes
affected the selection process).
158. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Washington, 392 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 2004) (deciding that
the University of Washington Law School's use of race in its admissions program was motivated
by the goal of attaining a "diverse educational environment"); Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v.
City of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that Denver's race-based ordinances were
enacted as an attempt to eliminate marketplace discrimination and to foster a more equal play-
ing field for minority business enterprises); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147,
1164 (10th Cir. 2000) (determining that the SCC racial presumptions were motivated by the goal
of attempting to remove deeply-rooted barriers prominent in the construction industry).
159. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (citations and quotations omitted). The
Court cited the testimony of several witnesses supporting the Law School's use of a critical mass,
recognizing that their reasoning was not motivated by any improper stereotyping or purpose.
See, e.g., id. at 318-19 (citing the testimony of the current Dean of the Law School, Jeffrey Leh-
man, who testified that "critical mass means numbers such that underrepresented minority stu-
dents do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race"); id. at 319-20 (citing the
testimony of Kent Syverud, a professor at the Law School when the admissions policy was
adopted, whose testimony "indicated that when a critical mass of underrepresented minority
students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there is
no 'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
160. See infra Part III.B.1.
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on harmful stereotypes. After making that determination, the courts
extend a greater degree of judicial respect for legislative and executive
judgments6-particularly respect for the judgments of government
actors in their selection of mechanisms to affirmatively carry out con-
stitutional and legislative equality mandates. 162
For example, in Grutter the Court accorded a degree of respect to
the judgment of the Michigan Law School within its area of expertise.
The Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educa-
tional benefits is substantiated by [the Law School] and their amici.
Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less
strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in an
area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university. Our
holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of
deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitution-
ally prescribed limits. 16
3
The Court deferred in this limited fashion to the Law School's
educational judgment only after taking history, current conditions, rel-
evant differences and likely consequences for minorities into account
and only after determining that the Law School's race-as-a-factor ad-
missions program was created for the purpose of fostering diversity
through inclusion in an otherwise largely exclusive educational
setting."6
The Grutter majority deferred to the Law School's "complex" ed-
ucational judgment, bolstered by evidence, partially because of the
161. Conversely, if a court finds realistically that the goal or the effect of the initiative is to
perpetuate group exclusion, or that the program relies on harmful racial stereotypes, then the
court should not accord any degree of respect to the government's chosen means.
162. Grutter amicus brief, supra note 7; see Smith v. Univ. of Washington, Law School, 392
F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 2004); Adarand v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
163. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. For further discussion of the Court's deference to govern-
ment expertise in Grutter and its implications, see Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter,
School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1696-97 (2004) ("For rea-
sons similar to those supporting local control in school desegregation, federalism supports a role
of deference for education officials in affirmative action litigation.").
164. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. Acknowledging its "tradition of giving a degree of defer-
ence to a university's academic decisions," the Court explained that, "given the important pur-
pose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." Id. at
329. This language suggests that the Court may have accorded an added measure of judicial
respect to the Law School's chosen means only because of the educational setting. This sugges-
tion is undercut, however, by United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), in which the court
abandoned the "least restrictive alternative" test in favor of "narrow tailoring" analysis, and
thereby accorded government actors greater flexibility in choosing the vehicles for achieving
equality goals outside the educational setting. See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (applying a "narrow tailoring" rather than "least restrictive alternative" test); see
infra notes and accompanying text.
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"expertise of the University" and partially because the Law School's
admissions program was carefully designed to promote inclusion of
qualified students of all races. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this view
in a post-Grutter case that also dealt with race in law school admis-
sions. In Smith v. University of Washington, Law School,165 the court
reasoned that when analyzing the law school's admissions policy,
courts "must assume that [the law school] acted in good faith in the
absence of a showing to the contrary and defer to its educational
judgments. 1 66
Significantly, the court did not analyze rigidly whether the law
school's use of race was the least restrictive alternative to achieving
the compelling state interest in student diversity.1 67 The court ac-
cepted the educational expertise of the law school that race as a plus
factor in admissions decisions was necessary to achieve its goal of di-
versity even though it recognized that other non-race criteria also pro-
moted diversity.a6 s This more flexible analysis of the "narrow
tailoring" component of strict scrutiny reflects a continuing evolution
of the heightened scrutiny standard in the face of mounting challenges
to race-conscious forms of affirmative action.
Grutter's more flexible recasting of the narrowly tailored prong of
strict scrutiny analysis built upon the Court's previous reformation of
that criteria for evaluating race-conscious programs beyond education
in United States v. Paradise.169 In Paradise, the Court considered
whether a "one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement to be ap-
plied as an interim measure to state trooper promotions in the Ala-
bama Department of Public Safety ...[was] permissible under the
equal protection guarantee. ' 170 The Court upheld the promotion re-
quirement, finding that the requirement was narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling governmental interest of remedying past and
present discrimination by the Alabama Department of Public
Safety.17
165. 392 F.3d 367.
166. Id. at 372 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29).
167. Id. at 375-76.
168. Id. at 378-79.
169. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
170. Id. at 153.
171. Id. at 166-67. The district court also found "that for almost four decades the [Alabama]
Department had excluded blacks from all positions, including jobs in the upper ranks." id. at
167. The Court noted that the United States conceded that "the pervasive, systematic, and obsti-
nate discriminatory conduct of the Department created a profound need and a firm justification
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Justice Brennan outlined a multi-faceted flexible analysis for de-
termining whether race-conscious relief was "narrowly tailored," re-
marking that courts should consider the "necessity for the relief and
the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the
relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship
of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of
the relief on the rights of third parties." '172 In addition to these fac-
tors, Brennan also "acknowledge[d that] the respect owed to a district
judge's judgment that specified relief is essential to cure a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment."'1
7 3
Crucially, Brennan observed that the remedial plans did not have
to be limited to "the least restrictive means of implementation."17 4
Government actors need some latitude in choosing among alternative
means of achieving equality goals. Taking these factors into consider-
ation, and affording the Department's choice of the means a measure
of judicial respect, even though it may not have been the "least drastic
alternative," the Court upheld the Department's promotion program,
finding it to be an "effective, temporary, and flexible measure. ''175
Grutter refined this more flexible casting of "narrow tailoring"
and then broadened its application. First, although the Court's major-
ity required the law school to give "serious, good faith consideration"
to alternatives that would achieve diversity,1 76 it did not require the
law school to adopt the "least restrictive alternative" if doing so would
force the school to "abandon the academic selectivity" integral to its
reputation. 177 Significantly, Grutter "does not require exhaustion of
for the race-conscious relief ordered by the [d]istrict [clourt." Id. (citing Brief for United States,
at 21).
172. Id. at 171.
173. Id. at 183.
174. Id. at 184.
175. Id. at 185.
176. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). The Court further explained its previous
narrow tailoring pronouncements: Richmond's set-aside plan was "not narrowly tailored where
'there does not appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means."' Id.
(citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)); narrow tailoring only
"'requires consideration' of 'lawful alternative and less restrictive means,"' but the Court did not
require the least drastic alternative. Id. at 339-40 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 276, 280, n. 6 (1986)).
177. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. One example of this factor is the Court's conclusion that the
law school reasonably refused to lower its emphasis on GPA and LSAT scores because such
alternatives would threaten its elite status. Id.
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every conceivable race-neutral alternative '  in order to satisfy the
narrowly-tailored prong of strict scrutiny.
179
Second, the Court concluded that universities could meet the nar-
row tailoring durational requirement through sunset provisions and
"periodic reviews to determine whether racial-preferences are still
necessary. "180 The Court deemed that requirement satisfied by the
law school's representation that it intended to end its race-conscious
program "as soon as practicable."18'
Finally, Grutter broadened the reach of Paradise's narrow tailor-
ing formulation. Paradise involved a specific remedy for de jure dis-
criminatory acts by the Department. Grutter applied the multi-
faceted, flexible test to mechanisms designed to achieve diversity
through inclusion, even in the absence of specific acts of discrimina-
tion by the law school.
E. Summary
Under Grutter, contextual strict scrutiny does not mean every
race conscious program will be upheld. It does indicate that although
strict in theory is no longer fatal in fact, the court will actually engage
in heightened scrutiny and invalidate undeserving race conscious pro-
grams. Gratz is a salient illustration.182 Contextual strict scrutiny vali-
dates some race conscious programs and invalidates others. Most
importantly, it engages judges in a thorough analysis of history, cur-
rent racial conditions, decisionmaker motives and likely conse-
178. Id. at 339.
179. The Grutter majority also concluded that the admissions program did not unduly burden
members of any racial group. Id. at 341. The law school's program did not unduly burden non-
minority students because it evaluated a number of diversifying factors and sometimes selected
non-minority applicants with diverse potential over underrepresented minority applicants. Id.
180. Id. at 342-43.
181. Id. at 343.
182. Gratz stemmed from the University of Michigan Office of Undergraduate Admission's
["OUA"] policy of automatically awarding twenty points to all applicants from under-
represented minority groups. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 256 (2003). In addressing the
reverse discrimination lawsuit, the Court, held that the OUA's policy was not narrowly tailored
to achieve the University of Michigan's compelling interest in educational diversity. Id. at 275.
The Court emphasized that it would utilize "a most searching examination." Id. at 270 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Unlike in Grutter, where the Law School conducted individu-
alized determinations of every applicant, the OUA quantified its factors in making admissions
decisions, presumably due to the volume of applicants applying to the University of Michigan's
undergraduate program. Id. at 275. Additionally, the Court compared the University of Michi-
gan's admissions program with the Harvard College Admissions Program, where the latter of-
fered applicants a more individualized selection process. Id. at 272-73. Thus, Gratz indicates




quences. Indeed, following Grutter and Gratz, lower federal courts
have applied somewhat uncertain forms of contextual strict scrutiny in
both upholding and invalidating differing race-conscious measures."8 3
Since Grutter addressed the specific issue of educational diversity,
the question arises whether its contextual approach applies in areas
other than affirmative action. In 2005, the Court's majority affirmed
its embrace of contextual strict scrutiny for all racial classifications,
including those beyond the realm of education and affirmative action.
In 2005, Johnson v. California' raised the threshold question of
whether strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review for Garrison
Johnson's challenge to California's unwritten policy of racially segre-
gating prison inmates.'85 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
reiterated that strict scrutiny applied to all government racial classifi-
cations18 6 and demanded careful inquiry into the "particularized cir-
cumstances" of the state's interest in maintaining prison security,
discipline and good order.187 Correction's officials would be subjected
to the same contextual strict scrutiny as any other decisionmaker,
even in the prison setting, because "[w]hen government officials are
permitted to use race as a proxy for gang membership and violence
without demonstrating a compelling government interest and proving
their means are narrowly tailored, society as a whole suffers."' 8
While endorsing heightened scrutiny, Justice O'Connor pointedly
reiterated the larger message of Grutter-"[s]trict scrutiny is not 'strict
in theory, but fatal in fact."" 89 Thus, applying strict scrutiny does not
indicate the "ultimate validity of any particular law." ' ° Significantly,
Justice O'Connor affirmed the current-conditions and relevant-differ-
ences inquiries introduced in Grutter and kept the door open for race-
conscious measures. Prisons are "dangerous places, the special cir-
cumstances they present may justify racial classifications in some con-
texts. Such circumstances can be considered in applying strict scrutiny,
which is designed to take relevant differences into account."19'
183. See infra Part II.F.
184. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
185. Id. at 1144.
186. Id. at 1148. The majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's deferential standard in the prison
context, which required only that the policy be reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest. Id. at 1146-47.
187. Id. at 1147.
188. Id. at 1149.
189. Id. at 1151 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
190. Id. at 1152.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
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It remains to be seen whether post-Grutter cases fully bear out
Justice O'Connor's instruction that, "[a]lthough all governmental uses
of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it."' 92
The Court remanded Johnson for a lower court determination of
whether strict scrutiny, properly applied, invalidates California's
prison policy. One lower court applied a form of contextual strict
scrutiny in a non-education, affirmative action setting to uphold the
government diversity initiative. 93 Other lower courts applied post-
Grutter strict scrutiny to invalidate race-conscious procedures in pub-
lic school student assignments 194 and admissions.1 95 Thus, in light of
Grutter, some federal and state courts 19 6 are ready and willing to con-
strue the two-part ends-means strict scrutiny test contextually.
F. Two Case Illustrations
The following detailed discussions of Adarand v. Slater197 on re-
mand and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle District
No. 1198 illuminate how contextual strict scrutiny can operate. The
192. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003).
193. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding, pursuant to
Grutter, that the City of Chicago proved a compelling operational need for a diverse police
department).
194. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle District No. 1, 377 F.3d 949 (9th
Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005).
195. See Cavalier v. Caddo Parrish School Bd., 403 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2005).
196. Ahead of the federal courts, the Hawai'i appellate courts have employed a contextual
strict scrutiny standard of review reflecting a greater degree of judicial respect in several cases
outside the realm of race and education. McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dept., 799 P.2d 953
(Haw. 1990), involved a challenge to the City of Honolulu's compelled drug-testing of police
officers. Employing the strict scrutiny standard of review, the Hawai'i Supreme Court concluded
that the police department's program served compelling state interests in police and public
safety. Id. at 957. Significantly, the court did not require the police department to provide de-
tailed factual proof that drug use was an on-duty problem or that off-duty drug use by a police
officer actually threatened police and public safety. Id. at 958. In reaching this conclusion, the
court largely deferred to the police department's judgment that prior methods of testing for drug
use by direct observations and investigation were ineffective and that the current test was the
best way to deal with a potentially serious problem. Id. McCloskey recited traditional strict
scrutiny language. In the absence of indicia of illegitimate motives, however, the Hawai'i Su-
preme Court applied a more contextual standard by giving a degree of deference to the agency's
chosen means to carry out its statutory duties.
For other Hawai'i appellate decisions illustrating a greater degree of judicial respect, see
Holdman v. Olin, 581 P.2d 1164 (Haw. 1978) (applying a flexible form of strict scrutiny under the
Hawai'i Equal Protection Clause and upholding a Department of Corrections gender-based di-
rective as necessary to meet a compelling state interest in public safety, even though less restric-
tive alternatives existed); Coyle v. Compton, 940 P.2d 404 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding a
domestic abuse statute by flexibly accepting the legislature's broad findings in the domestic vio-
lence area).
197. 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
198. 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005).
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conflicting majority and dissenting approaches to strict scrutiny in the
latter post-Grutter case also underscore the need for a settled, worka-
ble analytical method of application.
1. The Tenth Circuit's Decision in Adarand, a Federal Contracting
Case, Illustrates the Application of Contextual Strict
Scrutiny
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision on remand in Adarand em-
ploys a form of contextual strict scrutiny outside the educational di-
versity realm, and, more importantly, demonstrates how contextual
strict scrutiny can be applied in practice.199 The government identi-
fied the compelling interest at stake in the use of racial presumptions
in the SCC program as "remedying the effects of racial discrimination
and opening up federal contracting opportunities to members of previ-
ously excluded minority groups."2 ° In applying a contextual form of
strict scrutiny review, the court took relevant differences into account
and determined that the government's racial presumptions were de-
signed to promote inclusion and remove deeply-rooted disadvantages
and barriers prominent in the construction industry.2"'
The Tenth Circuit paid special attention to context. The court
agreed that the government's evidence regarding minority business
formation and competition in the subcontracting industry and the
kinds of obstacles minority subcontracting businesses face, constituted
a strong basis for the conclusion that those obstacles were not "the
same problems faced by any new business, regardless of the race of
the owners. , 2 0 2
The court also seriously considered the impact of racial group his-
tory on current racial conditions for minority-owned business firms. It
determined that the government's evidence demonstrated that dis-
crimination by "prime contractors, unions, and lenders ha[d] woefully
impeded the formation of qualified minority business enterprises in
the subcontracting market nationwide. ' 203 In addition, the court con-
199. Id. at 1164.
200. Id. (quoting Appellants' Br. at 21) (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1172 (quoting Appellee's Br. at 28). The court took notice of the fact that "Con-
gress repeatedly has considered the issue of discrimination in government construction procure-
ment contracts, finding that racial discrimination and its continuing effects have distorted the
market for public contracts - especially construction contracts - necessitating a race-conscious
remedy." Id. at 1167.
203. Id. at 1168.
[VOL. 49:241
Contextual Strict Scrutiny
cluded that discrimination by prime contractors, private sector cus-
tomers, business networks, suppliers, and bonding companies "fosters
a decidedly uneven playing field for minority subcontracting enter-
prises seeking to compete in the area of federal construction subcon-
tracts. ' 20 4 For those collective reasons, the court found both that the
racial presumptions in the subcontracting regulations were enacted to
foster equality in the federal contracting market and that the govern-
ment had a compelling interest in eradicating the "economic roots" of
racial discrimination in construction programs funded by federal
205monies.
After scrutinizing history, current conditions, relevant differ-
ences, and likely consequences, the court assessed whether the inclu-
sionary classification was actually motivated by "illegitimate notions
of racial inferiority or simple racial politics" in order to "smoke out"
an invalid classification.2 °6
Finally, because that inquiry revealed no illicit motive, the court
afforded a greater degree of judicial respect to Congress' extensive
findings of discrimination in the nationwide construction contracting
market.20 7 The court also largely accepted the government's judg-
ment that the subcontracting program was narrowly tailored to the
government interest of increasing minority participation because
other methods for addressing unequal opportunity had failed.20 ' The
court did not require rigid proof that the challenged mechanism was
the "least restrictive mechanism" even though it incidentally bur-
dened third parties. 209
2. The Ninth Circuit's Panel in Parents Involved Applied Post-
Grutter Contextual Strict Scrutiny to Invalidate a Race-As-
a-Factor Educational Policy
The Ninth Circuit applied a variation of the emerging contextual
strict scrutiny, post-Grutter, to strike down race-conscious measures in
secondary public schools. 210 The majority opinion in Parents Involved
204. Id. at 1170.
205. Id. at 1176 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
206. Id. at 1166.
207. Id. at 1168-71.
208. Id. at 1178, 1181.
209. Id. at 1183.
210. The Fifth Circuit has also invalidated the race-conscious admissions policy of a public
magnet school. See Cavalier v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 403 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2005). See infra
notes and accompanying text.
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shows that contextual strict scrutiny does not function as a judicial
rubber stamp by approving all race-conscious measures.
At trial, the Western District Court of Washington applied strict
scrutiny and upheld a school district's "open choice" assignment
plan.2 11 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the school
district's racial tiebreaker open-choice assignment plan violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 2
In line with Grutter, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
first found that "'constitutionally compelling internal educational and
external societal benefits flow from the presence of racial and ethnic
diversity' in high schools." '13 Engaging in a limited form of contextual
analysis, the court's general examination of current racial conditions
revealed that "continuing patterns of residential segregation ... mean
that the daily events and experiences that make up most Americans'
lives take place in strikingly homogenous settings." '14 As a result,
"most students entering college have had few opportunities for mean-
ingful interactions across lines of race and ethnicity. This separation
• ..provides little opportunity to disrupt racial stereotypes. ' 21 5  The
former "fatal in fact" scrutiny would have rendered this kind of in-
quiry unnecessary.
The court thus accepted as legitimate the school district's larger
diversity goal in creating the racial tiebreaker in light of history and
current racial conditions. The court, however, ultimately struck down
211. 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev'd, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd en
banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005). Under the open choice plan, each student was asked to rank
which high schools he or she would like to attend. A student would be assigned to a school if all
chosen schools were full. 377 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). Problems arose when schools were
"oversubscribed." Id. To resolve this problem, the school district used four tiebreakers. Id. If a
school was still oversubscribed after applying the first tiebreaker, the school district proceeded
to a second tiebreaker, which was based entirely on race. Id. For the racial tiebreaker, student
reported race on registration forms. Id. Registration forms were filled out in-person by a par-
ent. Id. If a parent chose not to specify a racial category, the school district assigned the student
a category "based on a visual inspection of the parent" or the student, if present. Id. Next, if
"students whose race (coded by the school district simply as white or non-white) could push an
integration positive school closer to the desired racial ratio, [the students were] automatically
admitted." Id. at 955-56.
212. 377 F.3d at 988-89. The district's student assignment plan was subsequently upheld en
banc by the Ninth Circuit in 2005. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005).
213. 377 F.3d at 964. The court acknowledged that in Grutter, the "social scientific evidence
and observational reports from business, industry, and military leaders regarding the 'substan-
tial' educational and societal benefits that flow from an educational institution's 'enroll[ment of]
a critical mass of minority students."' Id. at 963.
214. Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 11, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)).
215. Id. (emphasis added).
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the racial tiebreaker aspect of the plan. The court conducted a secon-
dary inquiry into empirical socio-economic data and determined that
the method chosen for achieving the goal was only one of several real-
istic possibilities.216
The court reached this conclusion after exploring three alterna-
tives to the racial tiebreaker that the school district never consid-
ered.217 After comparing the demographics with the racial tiebreaker
to those without it, the court found that "the data demonstrat[ed] that
the tiebreaker produces only the most trivial annual changes in school
demography., 218
The dissent argued that the "means" embodied in the school dis-
trict's plan had to be more closely viewed in its "historical and factual
context. ' 219  Seattle's dark history of racial school segregation was
highly relevant to the district's integration efforts through its desegre-
gation plan of the late 1970s.22° The dissent examined statistical data
in far greater depth than the majority in finding that despite other
remedial attempts, patterns of racial segregation persisted.221 This in-
formation demonstrated a cogent need for strong measures, such as a
racial tie-breaker.
In making these assessments, the dissent focused on broader pre-
sent-day racial conditions in Seattle and observed that the district had
a compelling interest in preventing Seattle's school system from re-
216. Id. at 970 ("[A]lthough numerous alternative admission structures have been proposed
to solve the School District's oversubscription dilemma without prominently featuring race in
the equation, not all have been (or ever were) seriously considered by the Board.").
217. The court discussed three alternative programs: (1) a citywide high school admissions
lottery; (2) a diversity-oriented policy that does not rely exclusively on race but accounts for the
wider array of characteristics that comprise true diversity rather than their racial and ethnic
identities; and (3) a more comprehensive plan proposed by the Seattle Urban League. See id. at
970-75.
218. Id. at 984-85. The court's majority then noted that the school district never "sought to
appraise the long-term social effects of engineering proportional demographic changes in con-
nection with its design of the tiebreaker." Id. at 983.
219. Id. at 998 (Graber, J., dissenting). "After decades of more coercive efforts to counteract
the effects of segregated housing patterns, [the district] adopted a high school assignment plan to
maximize school choices for students and their families while continuing to ensure that inte-
grated public schools are available to all." Id. at 989 (Graber, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 1001-03 (Graber, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 1005 (Graber, J., dissenting). The dissent noted the following statistics:
The District has consistently faced a pattern in which its white students live predomi-
nantly in the northern half of the city (in 2000-2001, 66.8 percent of the District's white
students lived in the northern half of the city) and its students of color-in each of the
three largest categories that the District tracks-live predominantly in the southern
half of the city. In 2000-2001, 74.2 percent of the District's Asian students, 83.6 percent





sembling the city's segregated housing pattern.22 2 The dissent also re-
lied upon educational research showing the importance of early school
experiences in breaking down racial and cultural stereotypes and the
relevance of desegregated institutions in providing long-lasting bene-
fits.223 Finally, the dissent examined the motives behind the school
district's plan-addressing de facto segregation in the education sys-
tem-and suggested the appropriateness of a degree of judicial defer-
ence to the district's chosen means.224
On rehearing en banc at the end of 2005, the Ninth Circuit va-
cated the panel's opinion and instead sided with the dissent's narrow
tailoring strict scrutiny analysis.225 Both the panel majority and dis-
sent in Parents Involved and the Ninth Circuit en banc applied ver-
sions of context-sensitive strict scrutiny.226 However, without clear
guidance from the Supreme Court about the necessary analytical que-
ries to be addressed and, particularly, the degree of respect owed to
the district's selection of the vehicle for achieving its goals, the judges
on the case disagreed over how to appropriately apply the new strict
scrutiny.
222. Id. at 990-91 (Graber, J., dissenting). By examining the district's housing map, the dis-
sent found striking that most non-white students were segregated in the south and southeast
areas of Seattle while only a small percentage lived in the economically-privileged northside.
The Ninth Circuit's en bane panel also considered Seattle's residential segregation. See Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166-69 (9th Cir.
2005) (identifying Seattle's "historical struggle with the problem of racial isolation in its public
school system"); id. at 1179 (holding that the "District's interests in obtaining the educational
and social benefits of racial diversity in secondary education and in avoiding racially concen-
trated or isolated schools resulting from Seattle's segregated housing pattern are clearly
compelling").
223. 377 F.3d at 992 n.9 (Graber, J., dissenting).
224. Prior court decisions supported the concept that "voluntary integration of schools [is a]
sound educational policy within the discretion of local school officials." Id. at 995 (citing Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann,
402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 473 (1982)).
225. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane).
226. Context is a key component of the strict scrutiny formulation in the Ninth Circuit's en
bane Parents Involved decision upholding the district's student assignment plan. See 426 F.3d
1162, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2005). According to the en bane panel, strict scrutiny will examine the
use of race in a particular context:
This heightened standard of review provides a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental deci-
sionmaker for the use of race in that particular context. In evaluating the District's Plan
under strict scrutiny, we also bear in mind the Court's directive that "[c]ontext matters
when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325.




The four-part analytical method for contextual strict scrutiny of-
fered in Part II aims to address that problem. It distills concepts and
language from Supreme Court opinions. In preliminary fashion, its
practical application is illuminated by the discussions of Adarand and
Parents Involved-the former upholding and the latter initially re-
jecting race-as-a-factor government initiatives designed to address
long-standing racial inequality. Like every analytical formulation, the
method is subject to critique. Because the Court has yet to describe a
method for applying its concepts, critiques of Grutter understandably
do not focus on the particulars of contextual strict scrutiny analysis.2" 7
Instead, those critiques raise broad questions about its workabil-
ity. Some of those questions raise "how to apply it" issues that are
addressed directly by the contextual strict scrutiny method we just de-
scribed. Others raise important jurisprudential issues about strict
scrutiny and colorblindness that are addressed in Part III. Still other
questions address the breadth of discretion now apparently afforded
judges. We discuss those questions here.
One version of this critique suggests that Grutter injected undue
uncertainty into strict scrutiny analysis.228 More specifically, judges
now can discretionarily apply the strict scrutiny test as rigidly or as
moderately as they please. 2 9 This unbounded discretion undermines
strict scrutiny and the Court's precedents.230 Over time rigid scrutiny
will morph into widely varying approaches to judicial review, effec-
tively destroying the concept of strict scrutiny review all together.231
227. For instance, one "conservative" reading of the Grutter opinion is that "the [Court] was
intellectually dishonest given that its pro-affirmative action result was secured by a Court that
purports to be dedicated to the protection of individual rights, race notwithstanding." Michelle
Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1941, 1944 (2004).
228. See Libby Huskey, Note, Affirmative Action in Higher Education-Strict in Theory, In-
termediate in Fact? Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), 4 Wyo. L. REV. 439, 472 (2003).
Even before Grutter, Ashutosh Bhagwat criticized the Court's inconsistent application of strict
scrutiny involving benign and invidious discrimination cases. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative
Action and Compelling Interests: Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 260 (2002). Bhagwat explains, "at a minimum, this level of scrutiny, which might be
called relaxed strict scrutiny permits governments to offer a wider range of governmental inter-
ests to justify their actions than might be available in other contexts, especially in comparison to
invidious discrimination, where essentially no governmental interests are considered sufficiently
to survive review." Id. at 278.
229. Huskey, supra note 228, at 472.
230. Id.
231. Id.; see also Eileen Kaufman, Discrimination Cases of the 2002 Term, 20 ToURo L. REV.




This critique is correct in describing the Court's announcement of
a new kind of context-sensitive strict scrutiny without providing a spe-
cific method for its application-that is why this Article undertakes
that task earlier in this Part. It is also correct in that post-Grutter strict
scrutiny requires a more searching and wide-ranging judicial inquiry.
Judges will need to identify the contextual grounding for their deci-
sions and to carefully explain their judgment calls. Thus, now some
race conscious programs now may be upheld under the contextual ap-
proach that would have been invalidated under the former fatal-in-
fact approach.232
This assessment of contextual strict scrutiny's impact on strict
scrutiny review itself,233 however, misses the mark. It avoids the big-
ger picture-the historical and contemporary realities driving the
evolution of strict scrutiny. Because overt government racial exclu-
sion eventually subsided after Brown (and in instances transformed
into more subtle forms), the only remaining government initiatives
mentioning race were those purposely designed to rectify continuing
racial inequality in schools, housing and jobs-programs of affirma-
tive action.2 34  Thus, rigid application of the old fatal-in-fact strict
scrutiny approach generated a hugely ironic result: strict scrutiny did
not touch subtly discriminatory government actions against members
of subordinated groups (because race was not explicitly men-
tioned);235 yet strict scrutiny invalidated every ameliorative racial
equality initiative (because race was addressed).
Without movement toward a more contextual method of analysis,
strict scrutiny would continue to stand equality on its head-turning a
blind eye to stark group-based inequality in real living conditions
while overturning government efforts to address those very
inequalities.
232. See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[R]acial entitlement-
even for the most admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future
mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the
eyes of the government, we are just one race here .... It is unlikely, if not impossible, that the
challenged program would survive this understanding of strict scrutiny ... ").
233. See Marisa Lopez, Comment, Lowering the Standard of Strict Scrutiny, 56 FLA. L. REv.
841, 846-47 (2004).
234. But see Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow's Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107 (2004).
235. The intent doctrine requires plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of a facially neu-
tral law to prove a racially discriminatory purpose on the part of those responsible for the law's




By seriously examining context, a court is not simply applying the
means-ends test rigidly or moderately according to its desire. Instead,
as part of the method described earlier, a reviewing court is instructed
to make a series of careful analytical inquiries, to announce its find-
ings while revealing its informational sources, and to explain and jus-
tify its evaluation. 36 Because discrimination claims "derive content
by an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative
that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations
that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in disregard
of variant controlling facts. 2 37
A second version of the undue discretion and uncertainty critique
maintains that "strict scrutiny analysis is [now] a frightening concept
because it is a step backwards towards a time when strict scrutiny did
not exist, a time when the Court upheld several malicious discrimina-
tion policies despite the existence of the Equal Protection Clause. '238
On its face the critique raises a serious issue. Beneath the surface,
however, it reveals less of a concern for the welfare of groups facing
malicious discrimination than for maintaining a group-based
hierarchy.
For instance, the John H. Finley Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)
recently employed the "frightening concept" language in an attempt
to broadly re-instate the former fatal-in-fact strict scrutiny approach.
In its Brief Amicus Curiae in Johnson, PLF warned that Grutter's
strict scrutiny approach threatened equality. 39  Its proof? The
Court's decision upholding the Japanese American internment in
Korematsu v. United States.240 In Korematsu, the Court purportedly
236. See Singer, supra note 24 (articulating and explaining social, political and economic in-
fluences upon judicial decisionmaking).
237. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339, 343-344 (1960)); see also Elizabeth Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict
Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2002) ("Racial segregation in the institutions of Ameri-
can civil society operates at three main levels: residential, educational, and occupational."). Ac-
cording to Census data, "in U.S. metropolitan areas as a whole, sixty-five percent of blacks
would have to move to attain a uniform distribution, a modest decline since 1980." Id. (citing
Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the
Underclass 64 tbl. 3.1 (1993)). Furthermore, Anderson notes that "jobs are segregated at the
regional, firm, and intrafirm levels." Id. at 1200. For example, within a white-owned firm lo-
cated in black neighborhoods, "one third still have no minority employees." Id. Moreover,
"[o]ne survey of jobs found that half of all job titles were occupied by whites only, and one-
quarter of blacks worked in jobs to which only blacks were assigned." Id.
238. See Huskey, supra note 228 (emphasis added).
239. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation at 11-19, Johnson v. California, 540
U.S. 1217 (2004) (No. 03-636).
240. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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applied strict scrutiny to assess the internment but actually deferred to
the judgment of military officials.241 Consequently, "the Court en-
gaged in a minimal review of the record... and then refused to sec-
ond-guess the determination of 'the properly constituted military
authorities' that internment of Japanese Americans was an appropri-
ate policy measure. '242 That assessment is accurate.
But the PLF distorted legal history by equating the Court's ap-
proval of the WWII incarceration of 120,000 mainly American citizens
on account of race without charges or a trial, with the Court's ap-
proval of the Michigan Law School's race-as-a-factor admissions pol-
icy designed to promote diversity in an otherwise largely segregated
student body. Missing from PLF's argument was context and an ac-
knowledgment of PLF's larger objectives in pushing the analogy.
PLF's amicus brief supported neither party in Johnson, and it ex-
pressed no view on the propriety of the challenged prison segregation
policy. Its underlying goal of removing context from strict scrutiny
emerged only indirectly in its argument that "[d]eference is incompati-
ble with strict scrutiny analysis, and threatens the effectiveness of
strict scrutiny as a mechanism for protecting individual rights and
equal treatment. 243
Rather than ending harmful exclusion and stigmatization, PLF
aimed to resurrect formal colorblindness, arguing that the old strict
scrutiny, fatal-in-fact, should be applied to all race-as-a-factor pro-
grams. Its "frightening concept" characterization of contextual strict
scrutiny was not actually about equal treatment and was not about
concern for people incarcerated without charges or trial on account of
race, as was the case in Korematsu. Rather, it was a side-door attempt
to invalidate every affirmative action program. PLF's critique thus
actually spoke to contextual strict scrutiny's jurisprudential underpin-
nings, particularly its rejection of formal colorblindness through its
embrace of a contemporary version of Legal Realism.
III. JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUAL
STRICT SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court's palpable embrace of contextual strict scru-
tiny has weighty implications. As described in Part II, contextual
241. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation at 13, Johnson, 540 U.S. 1217 (2004)
(No. 03-636).
242. Id. at 33.
243. Id. at 17.
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strict scrutiny brings depth and nuance to traditional ends-means
equal protection analysis. When scrutinizing race-conscious laws,
courts are now encouraged to distinguish government initiatives de-
signed to promote inclusion from those aimed at perpetuating historic
exclusion. While strict in "theory," the new approach comprehends
relevant differences by taking serious account of group histories and
current racial conditions in "fact."
In this fashion, a majority of the Court for the first time signaled
an explicitly contextual understanding of race and racial discrimina-
tion. In doing so, it implicitly rejected "formal colorblindness" as the
equal protection norm. What will this mean for government race-
based initiatives, and for civil rights litigation? Commentators' pre-
dictions vary widely, 24 4 and recent changes on the Supreme Court
bench will undoubtedly affect how contextual strict scrutiny
develops.2 45
One potential consequence is judicial movement toward reclama-
tion of the historic purpose of the Equal Protection Clause and civil
rights laws-to foster equality in the face of stark social and economic
realities of inequality in America. 246 A different kind of possibility is
a judicial slide back towards "fatal in fact" strict scrutiny review-a
principal use of the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate affirmative
action initiatives. Whether either of these possibilities, or any other,
mature into practical reality will depend on at least two things. The
first is the workability in practice of the new contextual strict scru-
tiny-this practical concern is addressed in Part II's description and
evaluation of a method for operationalizing contextual strict scrutiny.
The second is the strength of the jurisprudential underpinnings of that
method.
Part III encourages further discussion of these underpinnings,
Recall that Part II first frames the jurisprudential debate over the new
strict scrutiny's treatment of colorblindness in equal protection analy-
244. See supra section I.B.2; infra notes and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 46.
246. See Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). Professor Cass Sunstein
illuminates the original color-consciousness of U.S. civil rights laws. See SUNSTEIN, supra note
28, at 138-40. The "Reconstruction Congress that approved the Fourteenth Amendment simul-
taneously enacted a number or rae-specific programs for African-Americans," including the
Freedmans Bureau Act and legislation to assist African American soldiers. Id. Sunstein con-
cludes that "history cuts hard against the fundamentalists' view" of civil rights laws as originally
embracing pure color-blindness. Id. at 138; Eric K. Yamamoto, Reclaiming Civil Rights in Un-
civil Times, 1 HASTINOs RACE & POVERTY L.J. 11 (2003).
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sis. Part III begins by sketching two competing legal understandings
of race-"formal race," and what we are calling "contextual race." It
traces a majority of the justices' movement through their strict scru-
tiny analysis towards a more contextual understanding of race, racial
discrimination and equality initiatives, and then assesses that
movement.
Part III also characterizes Grutter's emphasis on history, current
racial conditions and relevant differences as a contemporary version
of Legal Realism-a "racial realism" shaped in part by empirical stud-
ies and documented historical research. Part III concludes that this
realism in racial equality analysis provides grounded and nuanced ju-
risprudential support for the Court majority's acceptance of race-in-
context in strict scrutiny review.
A. Different Meanings of Race In Anti-Discrimination Law:
Formal Race vs. Contextual Race
The Court's consideration of racial groups histories as linked to
current socio-economic conditions marks its embrace of a more con-
textual understanding of race itself. Prior to Grutter, uncertainty
loomed over which understanding of race the Court would employ in
its equal protection analysis. The Court's decisions in City of Rich-
mond v. Croson Co.247 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena248 and
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas249 seemed to invoke
divergent meanings of race in assessing affirmative action programs.
As a result, murkiness characterized the Court's equal protection
analysis.
Drawing upon the early work of Neil Gotanda,25 ° this section ex-
amines two important definitions of race discernable from the Court's
equal protection cases-"formal race" and "contextual race" (or
"race-in-context"). It also traces the recent shift towards contextual-
race as a central component of contextual strict scrutiny.
1. Formal race and colorblindness
Formal race is the view of race as a neutral concept. It is uncon-
nected to historical events and cultural understandings-it is merely
247. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
248. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
249. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
250. See Gotanda, supra note 40.
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"skin color."25' Gotanda sees formal race as the central idea behind
the prevailing view of colorblindness: that race is socially irrelevant, a
matter of appearance or skin color only.252 As an aspirational con-
cept, colorblindness is admirable. When used formally, however, it is
deeply problematic.253 As Gotanda explains, a mode of constitutional
analysis that ignores history "often fails to recognize connections be-
tween the race of an individual and the real social conditions underly-
ing a litigation or other constitutional dispute. 254
Professor Alan Freeman describes ethnic or racial fungibility as
"the notion that each of us bears an 'ethnicity' with an equivalent le-
gal significance and with an identical claim to protection against 'dis-
crimination,' despite the grossly disproportionate experience that
generated the legal intervention in the first place. '255 Employing col-
orblindness informed by formal race, courts do not need to distinguish
between laws designed to maintain historical exclusion from those de-
signed to promote inclusion, since all races are "fungible." This view
of race divorced from context treats all racial groups the same, despite
marked differences in racial group histories, wide disparities in cur-
rent socio-economic conditions, and empirically verified discrimina-
tion against some groups but not others in housing and employment
matters. 6  Racial group fungibility thus presumes, often wrongly, a
level racial group playing field in terms of status, socio-economic con-
ditions and life opportunities.
251. See id. at 4.
[F]ormal-race refers to socially constructed formal categories. Black and white are seen
as neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely 'skin color' or country of ancestral
origin. Formal-race is unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability. Moreo-
ver, formal-race categories are unconnected to social attributes such as culture, educa-
tion, wealth, or language.
Id.
252. See id. at 18 (1991) ("[N]onrecognition is a means of avoiding or repressing considera-
tion of the social relations and social context that are associated with race.").
253. Colorblindness as a general concept emerged from Justice Harlan's famous dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, which declared "[olur Constitution is colorblind." 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Numerous scholars have demonstrated the problem of removing Justice
Harlan's famous metaphor from its historical context. See Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics
of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTA-
TION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 50 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1525 (2d ed. 1988); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and
Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 968-69 (1992); Ross, supra note 48, at 401.
254. Gotanda, supra note 40, at 7.
255. Freeman, supra note 122, at 1066.
256. See supra Part II.A.2.
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With striking clarity, the Fifth Circuit employed formal race and
its concomitant racial fungibility in Hopwood v. Texas.257 Holding
that the University of Texas "may not use race as a factor in law
school admissions," ' the Fifth Circuit framed the issue in terms of
White students suffering discrimination at the hands of minority stu-
dents. Drawing upon Justice Scalia's approach in Croson,2 5 9 the court
did not distinguish between a program designed to promote the inclu-
sion of African Americans and Latinos from those that had systemati-
cally excluded those groups. Nor did the court closely examine the
long history of de jure racial exclusion in the Texas Law School it-
self 260 or scrutinize the vast continuing educational and socio-eco-
nomic disparities between whites and persons of color in Texas as a
whole.261
The Fifth Circuit's opinion treated race as merely skin color, a
morphological accident, 62 declaring that "[t]he use of race, in and of
itself, to choose students simply achieves a student body that looks
different. Such a criterion is no more rational on its own terms than
would be choices based upon the physical size or blood type of appli-
cants." 263 The court therefore concluded that race has no socially rel-
evant role and provided no basis for selecting among Latino, Black, or
White applicants. 26  Therefore, because the state law school's admis-
sion's process explicitly referenced race, formal strict scrutiny invali-
dated the program. As a result, minority admissions fell sharply-a
resegregating of the prestigious Texas Law School.265
257. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
258. Id. at 935.
259. The opinion begins with a quote from Justice Scalia, that "[rlacial preferences appear to
'even the score'. . . only if one embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed
as divided into races, making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should
be compensated for by discriminating against a white." Id. at 934-35 (quoting City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
260. See Kidder, supra note 119.
261. The trial court found the admissions program constitutional and that racial discrimina-
tion "in Texas is well documented in history books, case law, and the record of this trial." Hop-
wood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 554 (W.D. Tex. 1994); see also Charles R. Lawrence 111, Race
and Affirmative Action: A Critical Race Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF LAw, supra note 21, at
312-13 (describing the Fifth Circuit panel's disregard for the district court's "detailed findings of
fact and cavalier[ ] deni[al] [of] the reality of racism in Texas").
262. See Siegel, supra note 253.
263. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
264. For a thorough discussion of the colorblindness principle in this case see Siegel, supra
note 253.
265. At the law schools at the University of Texas, UCLA, and Boalt Hall combined, African
Americans made up two percent of enrollments in the five years following bans on the use of




The second definition of race discernable from the Court's equal
protection cases is what we call "contextual race." Contextual-race,
or "race-in-context," is a melding of what Gotanda terms "historical
race' 266 and "culture race. '267 Historical race describes social and ec-
onomic situations of racial groups that can be attributed to past events
and institutional practices, particularly long-standing discrimina-
tion.268 Culture race comprehends cultural traditions and social prac-
tices that may be generally tied to group identity.269 Contextual race
recognizes that the significance of the government's use of race in any
given instance is linked to history,270 culture, and current socio-eco-
nomic conditions. 7
Justice Ginsburg demonstrated her fealty to contextual race in
Adarand272 and Gratz. 273  Writing in favor of minority set-asides in
266. Gotanda, supra note 40.
Historical-race does assign substance to racial categories. Historical-race embodies past
and continuing racial subordination, and is the meaning of race that the Court contem-
plates when it applies 'strict scrutiny' to racially disadvantaging government conduct.
The state's use of racial categories is regarded as so closely linked to illegitimate racial
subordination that it is automatically judicially suspect.
Id. at 4.
267. Id. Gotanda uses African Americans as an example to demonstrate the operation of
culture-race:
[Clulture-race uses "Black" to refer to African-American culture, community, and con-
sciousness. Culture refers to broadly shared beliefs and social practices; community
refers to both the physical and spiritual senses of the term; and African-American con-
sciousness refers to ... traditions of self-awareness and to action based on that self-
awareness. Culture-race is the basis for the developing concept of cultural diversity.
Id. at 4-5.
268. See id. at 4.
269. See id. at 56 ("Culture-race includes all aspects of culture, community, and
consciousness.").
270. See id. at 40 ("[I]n historical-race usage, racial categories describe relations of oppres-
sion and unequal power. Historical-race usage of Black does not have the same meaning as
usage of white: Black is the reification of subordination; white is the reification of privilege and
super-ordination.").
271. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s (2nd ed. 2001).
272. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 271 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens' Adarand dissent also resonates with race contextually defined. Justice Stevens
chided the majority for ignoring "the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome
mat." Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For Justice Stevens, racial group classifications are not
fungible. Black and White have divergent historical and present-day social meanings, and the
Court should explicitly recognize this and not treat "dissimilar race-based decisions as though
they were equally objectionable." Id. Professor Reva B. Siegel notes the "eerie parallels be-
tween Justice Harlan's passionate challenge to legal formalism" urging courts to take account of
what "everyone knows" about the "real meaning" of segregation, and Justice Steven's appeal to
common social understanding in Adarand. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination In the Eyes of the
Law: How "Colorblindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 77, 108-09 (2000).
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federal sub-contracting, Justice Ginsburg highlighted the importance
of racial context, specifically "history and practical consequences." '74
Justice Ginsburg's legal realism emphasized "discrimination's linger-
ing effects," and underscored the sharp difference between Black and
White experiences in American history.275 To pretend "that the issue
presented in Bakke was the same as the issue in Brown is to pretend
that history never happened and that the present doesn't exist." '276
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Gratz also reflected contextual race.
Taking account of the United States' history of discrimination and its
pernicious effects, Justice Ginsburg linked the state university's use of
race to present-day conditions generated by historical forces. We are
"not far distant from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of
centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our
communities and schools." '27 7 Black and White are more than skin
colors, and actions "designed to burden groups long denied full citi-
zenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten
the day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects have
been extirpated." '278
Justice Ginsburg's deployment of contextual race in this nuanced
fashion illuminated two key understandings of color in constitutional
law, one deprecatory and one salutary:
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid
conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, a classification that de-
nies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based
on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But the Con-
stitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetu-
ated and to undo the effects of past discrimination. 9
Along these lines, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in
Adarand, Grutter, and Johnson, gradually embraced a more contex-
tual approach to race and strict scrutiny. As described in Part I, Jus-
tice O'Connor's Adarand opinion revealed an evolving contextual
273. Gratz v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
274. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 274 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at n.8 ("[W]hatever the source of racism, to count it the same as racialism, to say
that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights have been mostly about freedom
from racial categorization rather than freedom from racial oppression, is to trivialize the lives
and deaths of those who have suffered under racism.") (quoting Stephen L. Carter, When Vic-
tims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433-34 (1988)).
276. Id.
277. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).




view of race, explaining that "[tihe unhappy persistence of both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against mi-
nority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government
is not disqualified from acting in response to it."28 Justice O'Connor
thus invoked current racial conditions and a history of subordina-
tion-hallmarks of a contextual definition of race in strict scrutiny re-
view-in order to evaluate race-conscious decision-making.28'
As discussed in Part II, race-in-context now treats race in relation
to its group histories, social conditions and cultural expression.282 By
embracing "context," the Court's majority now signals a willingness to
recognize patterns of differences that distinguish groups of people for
social, economic and political purposes.283 Context informs interpre-
tation and assessment-the key tasks of strict scrutiny analysis. 284
B. Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Shift Toward Contextual
Race
1. Contemporary "Racial Realism"
When context informs strict scrutiny review in this fashion it "ex-
poses how the [old] rules governing equal protection review actually
disadvantage communities of color. '2 85 Courts no longer can resort to
an abstraction-like formal race-to easily invalidate race-as-a-factor
government affirmative action initiatives. 286 Contextual strict scrutiny
demands that courts make realistic, rather than formalistic,
assessments.
Those demands for realistic assessments are an outgrowth of the
1930s "Legal Realism. '287  Legal Realism emerged as a potent cri-
280. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
281. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005).
282. See infra Part II. For a discussion of the varying meanings and uses of "context," see
Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990).
283. See id. at 1600.
284. "Social scientists ... emphasize the important role that context plays in generating the
meanings associated with race and in mediating the harms associated with racially stigmatized
status." See, R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 847-48 (2004).
285. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 126-27 (5th ed. 2004).
286. See Hopwood v. Texas, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (adopting a strong version of formal color-
blindness to invalidate the Texas Law School's affirmative action program). See supra notes and
accompanying text.
287. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas
A. Reed eds., 1993); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal




tique of legal formalism. 288 It challenged the notion of "law as an au-
tonomous" system of internally consistent rules that functioned
objectively and that could be understood without reference to other
disciplines. 289  For those committed to formal legal reasoning, rules
were applied to facts to produce just results-by definition.2 90  The
identity of the parties and judges, the social and historical setting of
the controversy, judges' value judgments on close-calls and likely
human consequences-all fell largely beyond the ken.29 1
Legal realist scholars exploded this conception of the legal pro-
cess. They enabled one to look at, and then behind, stated rules and
traditional reasoning methods to comprehend the social and political
dynamics informing actual judicial decisionmaking.292 While most
judges endeavored to be fair and follow the law, the judges' political
perspectives and cultural experiences created the lens that shaped
how they viewed history, construed legal norms, and ascertained "rel-
Professor Karl Llewellyn first identified Legal Realism as a jurisprudential movement in 1930.
See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 431
(1930) and developed a description shortly thereafter. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1222-24 (1931). Legal
Realism spawned many varied schools of legal thought-all with the rejection of legal formalism
at their core. Those diverse schools of thought include Law and Economics, Critical Race The-
ory, Feminist Legal Theory, Legal Pragmatism and LatCrit Theory and Practice. See generally
Bell, supra note 25 at 368 n.17.
288. See Mensch, supra note 21, at 32-36. The Realist critique was such a potent "assault
upon conventional legal reasoning, cutting so deeply into the premises of American legal
thought, that subsequent legal thinkers are still struggling to rebuild a convincingly coherent
structure." Id. at 33.
289. See id. at 32-33 ("[R]ealists urged judges to eschew the rigid, abstract formalism.., thus
removed law from its sphere of autonomous logic, and placed it squarely within the larger politi-
cal/social system."); see also Singer, supra note 24 at 474 (offering that the significance of Legal
Realism was the desire to replace formalism with a pragmatism that understands law as "based
on human experience, policy, and ethics, rather than formal logic").
290. See Mensch, supra note 21, at 30 (explaining that rules were to "be applied rigidly and
formally, to any particular social context; in fact failure to do so would be evidence of judicial
irrationality and/or responsibility").
291. See Singer, supra note 24, at 470-73 (describing the wide range of factors excluded from
consideration in evaluation of judicial decisions).
292. See Mensch, supra note 21, at 34 (explaining the Realist illumination that rules, like
words, "are created by people in history, and their definition inevitably varies with particular
context and with the meaning brought to them by the judges who are asked to interpret them.
The act of interpretation is, in every instance, an act of social choice."); see also Aviam Soifer,
Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699 (2002) (analyzing the political underpinnings of the
Court's analysis in Bush v. Gore and other recent Rehnquist Court decisions).
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evant" facts.2 93 For legal realists, sociology, psychology and econom-
ics helped unravel "formalism" and replace it with "realism., 294
Grutter's movement away from formal race and firmly toward
contextual race implicates a contemporary version of Legal Real-
ism 29 5 -a "racial realism ' 296 grounded in a systematic examination of
social science studies and documented historical research.297 The
293. See K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930); Felix
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935);
see also Mensch, supra note 21, at 34 ("There was no such thing as objective legal methodology
behind which judges could hide in order to evade responsibility for the social consequences of
legal decision making. Every decision they made was a moral and political choice.").
294. See Bell, supra note 25 at 365. For an analysis of the empirical research component of
Legal Realist thought, see generally JOHN H. SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EM-
PIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).
295. See generally Singer, supra note 24.
296. Bell, supra note 25, at 364 (coining the phrase "Racial Realism" to denote legal realism
in racial justice analysis). Professor Karl Llewellyn may have been an early "racial realist" as
well. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Group Prejudice and Social Education, in CIVILIZATION AND
GROUP RELATIONSHIPS 11, 29-30 (R.M. MacIver ed., 1954) ("I happen to be a realist in jurispru-
dence, in sociology, and in psychology, and the job of a realist is to begin by seeing exactly what
he is up against.., and finds ways and means that will work [and] implements ideals with hands
and feet that stand on and can take hold of the here and now."); Karl N. Llewellyn, What Law
Cannot Do For Inter-Racial Peace, 3 VILL. L. REV. 30, 31 (1957) (maintaining that the legal
system could be employed to "set up ideals still far from full attainment, [and] to set up tension
[between actual and aspirational racial reality]," but warning the tension could lead to a popular
backlash). Other possible early examples of "racial realism" include FELIX S. COHEN, HAND-
BOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942); Felix S. Cohen, To Secure These Rights: The Report of
the President's Committee on Civil Rights, 57 YALE L.J. 1141 (1948); Robert L. Hale, Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. ScI. Q. 470, 471-79 (1923) (arguing
that no interaction is free from the coercive forces of the government because all interactions,
including ostensibly private ones, take place against the background of public law, which confers
rights, obligations, and liberties on parties in a systemically discriminatory manner and, there-
fore, constitutional rights could not protect individuals from state coercion); Robert L. Hale,
Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Indi-
viduals, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 627, 628-29 (1947) (noting that although lynching was a crime in
most states, "lynchers are rarely if ever punished" and arguing that racial discrimination prac-
ticed by private individuals is "just as effective as if it were practiced by the state itself").
297. By referring here to social science and "documented" history we are distinguishing, and
rejecting, the pseudo-scientific ethnography of the 19th Century and early 20th Century that
created a racial hierarchy based upon the superiority and inferiority of the races. See FEAGIN &
FEAGIN, supra note 26, at 6-9. For example, in Grutter the Court relied on various social science
and empirical studies to support its holding that Michigan had a compelling state interest in
diversity in university admissions. Justice O'Connor explains:
In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous
studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and "better
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society; and better
prepares them as professionals." Brief for American Educational Research Association
et al. as Amici Curiae 3; see, e.g., W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape of the River (1998);
Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action (G. Orfield & M.
Kurlaender eds. 2001); Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence on Racial Dy-
namics in Colleges and Universities (M. Chang, et al., eds. 2003).
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). For additional historical accounts and social science studies
relied upon by the Court in Grutter, see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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Brandeis brief298 and Brown's Black/White doll studies299 were empir-
ical precursors. With its emphasis on history in relation to current
racial conditions and its close examination of relevant racial differ-
ences as reflected in government initiatives, Grutter quietly yet mo-
mentously stamped the Court's imprimatur on "racial realism"
through multidisciplinary analysis of law in context.
The high Court, of course, has long asked historical questions.
But those queries often have focused narrowly on the intent of legisla-
tors or framers at the time of enactment 300 or provided general back-
ground (never later referenced).3 °1 Many of the historical accounts
have presented skewed views of events, interactions and impacts.30 2
Grutter's multidisciplinary analysis invites historical accounts from va-
298. Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In Muller, future-
Justice Brandeis introduced this new type of appellate legal brief, emphasizing economic and
social evidence rather than legal precedents, which was cited by the Court in its opinion. See
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419, n.1 (1908).
299. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing K. B. Clark, Effect of
Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White House Confer-
ence on Children and Youth, 1950)); see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY
OF Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality 315-21 (Vintage
Books 2004). In addition to the Doll Studies, the Supreme Court relied on the influential study
by Swedish sociologist GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILLEMA (1944). See Brown, 347 U.S.
at 494 n.11.
300. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
301. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also supra notes
89-99 and accompanying text.
302. For example, in upholding the Japanese American internment, the Court did not ac-
knowledge the deep history of West Coast government and business hostility toward Japanese
Americans. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) ("The judgment that ex-
clusion of the whole group was for . . . a military imperative answers the contention that the
exclusion was in the nature of group punishment based on antagonism to those of Japanese
origin."); cf. id. at 239, n.12 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("The reasons [for the internment] appear,
instead, to be largely an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths and insinua-
tions that for years have been directed against Japanese Americans by people with racial and
economic prejudices-the same people who have been among the foremost advocates of the
evacuation."). See also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 527-28 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The Court's holding today rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have
little, if any, application to the compelling history of the State of Hawai'i.").
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rying perspectives, °3 particularly from the standpoint of those en-
gaged in long-term struggles for equality.3 °4
The Court also has entertained empirical studies in an array of
cases. 30 5 Brown's use of social science to establish the inherent harm
of racially separate schools is the touchstone.30 6 The Court's overall
approach to the utility, and indeed appropriateness, of social science
for racial disputes, however, has been sporadic at best. The Court has
often ignored or discounted that genre of information even when it
shed bright light on the grounds for a discrimination challenge or the
303. History-telling is itself a selective accounting of events and trends, and historical ac-
counts are often contested. Professor Yamamoto's writing on "collective memory" describes the
intense debates at the threshold of justice struggles to frame the history of grievance and injus-
tice. See Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social Justice,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2000) (analyzing the selective accounting of Hawaiian history in Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)). Professor Alfred
Brophy's careful research on the little-known White Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 is an exemplar of a
documented, credible historical-legal account. Working with a state commission, Brophy docu-
mented the complete destruction of a flourishing African American township and the killing of
over 100 Blacks by Whites following a White woman's false rape accusation. ALFRED BROPHY,
RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921 (2002). His description of
neighboring Whites' subsequent manipulation of the legal system to acquire title to the African
Americans' lands, and their ensuing code of silence, gave voice eighty years later to the 100
Black survivors and illuminated in real-life terms the meanings of violence and legal subordina-
tion in Jim Crow America. That history provided the foundation for proposed state reparations
legislation and emerged as the heart of a federal court reparations lawsuit. See Alexander v.
Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Al-
exander v. Oklahoma, No. 03-CV-133 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.tul-
sareparations.org/Complaint2ndAmend.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
304. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (describing how court opinions tend to overlook the per-
spectives of those "at the bottom" and arguing for the necessity of having those perspectives
presented and considered); see also Minow & Spelman, supra note 282 (demonstrating how at-
tention to context often has the effect of bringing forward often bypassed perspectives of those
outside society's mainstream).
305. See Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment
Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J.
1487 (1997). Many of those studies have been used to shed light on aspects of the legal system's
operations-for example, the comparative effects of mediation rather than trial in domestic vio-
lence disputes. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
306. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of
Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005); William E.
Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, 48 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 795 (2004). The Clark doll studies have themselves been the source of contestation. See
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 42-43 (2000) (describing
the "numerous problems with the study"); Sanjay Moody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in His-
torical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
793 (2002) (describing the historical debate over Footnote 11 and critiques of the technical qual-
ity of the research cited therein).
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foundation for the government initiative aimed at remedying past
discrimination.3 o7
Grutter's approach to comprehending race in context elevates the
status of social science in law to new heights,30 8 as an integral means
of establishing context. And Grutter does so just ahead of an on-rush-
ing realist research juggernaut.
Over the last ten years a new kind of socio-legal research has
exploded into the legal arena.30 9 In the racial equality realm alone,
this research addresses a startling array of issues. It encompasses
what race is and how racial categories are constructed,3a0 how people
stereotype others and how this informs differing types of discrimina-
tory behavior,311 how internalized negative stereotyping can hurt indi-
vidual performance,312 how standardized aptitude tests can reflect
307. The McCleskey majority declared irrelevant to equal protection analysis vast empirically
verified racial disparities in death penalty sentencing. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
314 (1987). Likewise, in invalidating a minority set-aside city ordinance in Croson, Justice
O'Connor discounted strong empirical data on discrimination in government contracting. See
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-06 (1989).
308. Justice Thomas explicitly acknowledged the degree to which the Grutter majority relied
on historical and sociological research. Revealing his own formalist approach, Justice Thomas
took issue with how "the Court relied heavily on social science evidence to justify its deference."
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Scholars have noted that
the Court's reliance on this kind of source material "is consistent with a growing trend of judicial
opinions embracing an increasingly multidisciplinary approach." Heise, supra note 306, at 313.
309. This research is an outgrowth of, but distinct from, the initial "Law and Society Associa-
tion" research that focused on measuring how "law on books" differed from "law in action." See
Bell, supra note 25, at 368 n.17; see also Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empiri-
cal Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
819 (2002) (describing the growth of empirical legal scholarship); Austin Sarat & Jonathan Si-
mon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal
Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001); Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and
Economics, Law and Other Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 403 (2004) (describing the importance of empirical inquiry in Law and Economics,
and the corresponding influence on broader legal scholarship); Ian Ayres, Is Discrimination Elu-
sive?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2419, 2428 (2003) (book review) (describing the importance of empirical
evidence for lawmakers). See generally Symposium: Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social
Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1075 (2003); Symposium:
Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791. (2002).
310. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 271 (outlining a groundbreaking sociological theory on
the formation of racial categories and the creation of racial meanings in American society).
311. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psy-
chology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The
Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004);
Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
(forthcoming Mar. 2005); Kang, supra note 126; Krieger, supra note 126; Brian A. Nosek et al.,
Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DY-
NAMICS 101 (2002).
312. See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity
and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997).
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cultural biases,313 how jurors' cultural perceptions affect their under-
standing of facts and legal concepts,314 how seemingly neutral institu-
tional practices can contribute to differing racial (and gender)
treatment,315 how economics influences corporate responses to issues
of diversity and discrimination,3 t6 and how gender317 and race are
connected to poverty.318 These studies, theoretical and empirical,31 9
underscore a salient point: race in context matters.
Contextual strict scrutiny is jurisprudentially significant, then, be-
cause it embraces a socio-historical "racial realism" and, in doing so,
controversially rejects the utility of "formal race" in strict scrutiny
review.
313. See William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences
in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite" College Students, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1055 (2001); William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender Bias on the LSAT and
Its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2000); Wil-
liam C. Kidder, The Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred: A Critical Analysis of the MBE,
Social Closure, and Racial and Ethnic Stratification, 29 LAW & Soc. INoUIRY 547 (2004).
314. Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries: How
"Legal Priming" Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CINN. L. REV. 1059 (2005).
315. See Lopez, Institutional Racism supra note 155.
316. See Kellye Testy, Capitalism and Freedom-For Whom?: Feminist Legal Theory and
Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (2004).
317. See Regina Austin, "Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother's Back": Poor Moms, Myths of
Authority, and Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273
(2002); Athena Mutua, Why Retire the Feminization of Poverty Construct?, 78 DENV. U.L. REV.
1179 (2001); Laura M. Padilla, Gendered Shades of Property: A Status Check on Gender, Race &
Property, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 361 (2002).
318. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE
UNDERCLASS (1992); Robert B. Chapman, Missing Persons: Social Science and Accounting for
Race, Gender, Class, and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANK. L.J. 347 (2002); Alex M. John-
son, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect To Prevent Integration: Destablilizing Race as a Vehicle
to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595 (1995); Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Ine-
quality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 31 (2003).
319. This socio-legal research on race is set within the broader expansion of empirical legal
research. See generally Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social
Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1 (2002); Ayres, supra note 309, at 2428; Devon
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J.
1757, 1785 (2003) (book review) (describing the utility of statistical analysis along with personal
narratives in law). Of course, social science research rarely produces definitive results, and the
starting points and assumptions for any research project shape its path and findings. There is
definite value in critique and counter-studies. For instance, recent path-breaking empirical stud-
ies employing social cognition theory to test for decisionmakers' implicit racial bias have had
profound implications for anti-discrimination law. See Nosek et al., supra note 311. Those stud-
ies have been followed by dozens of others both to cross-check the original work and extend or
modify it. See, e.g., William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisit-
ing the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332 (2004).
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2. Contextual Race Versus Formal Race In Strict Scrutiny Review
Grutter's jurisprudential realism is thus rekindling the fires of the
long-simmering debate about constitutional colorblindness. By em-
bracing government race-consciousness in some circumstances (what
we are calling contextual race), the Court's majority cast into disfavor
the pure colorblindness, or formal race, advocated by several justices.
As evidenced by heated justice and commentator reactions, the de-
bate over the propriety of that shift will continue if not intensify.
To further the debate over contextual race versus formal color-
blindness in strict scrutiny review, we make our assessment at this
stage of the discussion with two realist concepts in mind: first, abstrac-
tion, and second, masking stratification.
a. Abstraction
Legal arguments favoring formal colorblindness often appear
compelling when presented abstractly as issues of "fairness."32 When
narrowly framed without regard to history or current conditions, fair-
ness focuses solely on the unsituated individual-each of us should be
judged as an individual and not on an irrelevant measure like race.321
This conception of fairness is appealing in the abstract. Yet, it is im-
poverished. All people are tied inextricably to social structures-
schools, family, spiritual centers, social clubs, cultural activities.3
22
Our identities determine, in part, the tenor of our daily social interac-
tions. In terms of treatment by social institutions or the law, fairness
can only be assessed in actual social settings.323 Professor Richard
Delgado aptly describes the fallacy of treating fairness in university
admissions as an abstract principle:
Fairness, including fairness in testing, is always a contested concept,
always relative to someone's interests, perspectives, and purposes.
It does not stand outside experience in some external realm. It's a
matter of what we deem important. And the 'we' is generally those
320. These arguments tend to equate evenhandedness with fairness so that only rules that
treat everyone the same qualify as fair. See Barbara Flagg & Katherine Goldwasser, Fighting for
Truth, Justice, and the Asymmetrical Way, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 105, 108 (1998).
321. In a speech to university students, Linda Chavez argued that the Grutter and Gratz
opinions were flawed because they "read like social science textbooks, not law books[.] I believe
every individual should be viewed as an individual. They need to be looked at on the content of
their character and their effort and performance, not based on a racial group." Sarah Goldfarb,
Chavez Shares Opinions on Affirmative Action, THE DIGITAL COLLEGIAN, Mar. 30, 2004, http://
www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2004/03/03-30-04tdc/03-30-04dnews-09.asp.




who are in a position to assure that their own merits, values, stand-
ing and excellence remain untouched.324
Abstract notions of fairness employed in the color-blindness de-
bate are impractical because they run counter to what empirical stud-
ies continue to show-race is relevant to a person's social
opportunities and obstacles. 25 Formal colorblindness is blind to the
present-day effects of America's glaring history of racial
discrimination.326
Unlike formal colorblindness, contextual race in strict scrutiny re-
view does not resort principally to abstractions. This is significant be-
cause in the realm of anti-discrimination law, "abstract principles lead
to legal results that [can] harm blacks and perpetuate their inferior
status. ' 327 As mentioned, contextual race in strict scrutiny review em-
braces a contemporary version of racial realism.32 8 This is important,
since "[w]e are all legal realists now. "329 Realism "clear[s] the air of
beguiling but misleading conceptual categories . . . so that thought
[can] be redirected to . . . a close, contextual examination of social
reality-to facts ... and ethics., 3 3' Racial groups are not treated as
fungible abstractions, but are placed within their particular historical
and social contexts.
Beguiling tropes of formal colorblindness and individual fairness
are recognized as problematic abstractions when courts define race in
context. As aptly observed by Professor Phillip Frickey concerning
federal Indian law specifically, but applicable generally to anti-dis-
crimination law, "[u]nless injected with a heavy dose of historical per-
spective and legal realism, formal lawyerly analysis not only often fails
to illuminate the [real] issues... but can also result in deceiving con-
clusions. '13 3 1 Strict scrutiny review informed by contextual race does
324. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1711, 1742 (1995).
325. See supra Part II.A.2; see also CORNELL WEST, RACE MATrERS (1993).
326. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, supra note 115, at 705-06 (discussing the causal connection
between past discrimination and racial disparities in female-headed households and out-of-wed-
lock births); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
"Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998) (examining America's his-
tory of racial discrimination in immigration policy).
327. Bell, supra note 25, at 369.
328. See supra Part III.B.1.
329. Singer, supra note 24, at 467.
330. Mensch, supra note 21, at 35.; see also Bell, supra note 25, at 367.
331. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Fed-
eral Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1757 (1997).
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not ignore "social questions about which race in fact has power and
advantages and which race has been denied entry for centuries.
332
For instance, in Grutter, colorblindness proponents obscured the
significant distinction between race-as-a-factor affirmative action at
the Michigan Law School on the one hand and Jim Crow segregation
in every facet of African American life on the other. Equating the
race-as-a-factor admissions at issue in Grutter with de jure segregation
in Brown empowered supporters of formal colorblindness to channel
our moral disgust for slavery and segregation and direct it against gov-
ernment efforts to ameliorate the continuing effects of slavery and
segregation.333 A likely consequence of that position-the exclusion
of African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans from the law
school student body and the reinstitutionalization of a racial hierarchy
in elite higher education.334
By contrast, the contextual view of race in strict scrutiny analysis
discussed in Part II distinguishes between race-as-a-factor admissions
and Jim Crow segregation laws. It recognizes that the affirmative ac-
tion program challenged in Grutter could never be the moral
equivalent of the white racial apartheid laws in Brown.33 5 It does not
mean that every affirmative action program will be upheld. It does
mean that contextual race is more solidly grounded than formal color-
332. Bell, supra note 25, at 369 (discussing the formalistic interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Bakke).
333. Professor Guy-Uriel E. Charles explains that "from this perspective, colorblindness as a
constitutional principle is a moral imperative." Charles, supra note 80, at 2023. To illustrate the
point, Professor Charles explains that both "the actions of Sweatt v. Painter and Hopwood v.
Texas are constitutionally suspect .... By lumping both cases into the same broad category, an
affirmative action remedy to facilitate the legal education of people of color is classified on the
same moral plane as a plan that categorically denied admission to any person of color." Id. at
2022.
334. See Karst, supra note 46, at 385 (If the "racial status quo is taken as equilibrium ... a
race-conscious remedy-one aimed at redressing the myriad corruptions of public life produced
by the stigma of caste-is itself a transgression of formal neutrality, for it alters the equilibrium
of the status quo"); see generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE
RIVER: LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY AD-
MISSIONS (1998).
Barbara Grutter's invocation of colorblindness is also problematic because formal-race lim-
its the idea of racism as a simple, individual centered prejudice, downplaying the persistence of
system racial subordination in university admissions. See Gotanda, supra note 40, at 43 ("For-
mal-race and the application of strict scrutiny lend themselves to superficial critiques of affirma-
tive action programs, thus legitimizing the continued subordination of [historically
disadvantaged groups].").
335. Rather than invoking abstractions, contextual race in strict scrutiny review directs
courts to a practical inquiry. Courts need not hide behind amorphous formalisms, but acknowl-
edge that "there is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to
perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination." Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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blindness in constitutional analysis precisely because it makes salient
real-life distinctions and does not abjure history in evaluating the va-
lidity of a program.
Practically speaking, then, formal colorblindness in strict scrutiny
review is intensely problematic because it entreats courts to employ
an abstraction (all racial groups are identically situated) to strike
down all race-conscious programs.
b. Masking Stratification
Professor Derrick Bell sees an even deeper problem with formal
colorblindness in strict scrutiny analysis. Some judges and advocates
"use abstract concepts, such as equality, to mask policy choices and
value judgments." '336 For Professor Bell, some opponents of contex-
tual race employ colorblindness as a rhetorical device less to achieve
racial equality than to stymie government ameliorative efforts.
Using colorblindness to mask policy choices and value judgments
obscures racial motivations and helps perpetuate stratification along
racial lines. According to Professor Reva B. Siegel, colorblindness
discourse serves as a mask because it "functions as a semantic
code" '3 37 for maintaining group-based inequalities (racial stratifica-
tion).338 For Siegel, colorblindness disguises the distributive conse-
quences of ostensibly race-blind practices.
Indeed, racial stratification remains a reality in America. Social
and economic goods have long been distributed along racial lines-for
instance, between 1946 and 1960, of 350,000 new homes built with
Federal Housing mortgage support in northern California, fewer than
100 went to Black families, while White families routinely received
FHA mortgages. 339 This kind of huge racial disparity in housing op-
336. Bell, supra note 25, at 369. Abstraction can serve the same "masking" purpose as stare
decisis where it is used to obscure the court's actual reasoning.
337. Siegel, supra note 272, at 89.
338. Id. at 84 ("When we say we are distributing goods and opportunities in a race- and
gender-blind fashion, we recognize group identity but ignore the ordinary status consequences
[that is, maintaining hierarchy] of group identity for purposes of the relevant social
transaction.").
339. See Troy Duster, Individual Fairness, Group Preferences, and the California Strategy, in
RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 111, 118 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin
eds., 1998). According to Professor Duster, "[tihat same pattern [of discrimination in distribu-
tive practices] holds for the whole state [of California], and for the nation as well." Id. Accord-
ing to the Census Bureau, in 1999, 74% of suburban residents owned their own homes, while
only about half of urban residents are homeowners. The proportion is similar when you compare
homeowners by race-in 1999, 74% of Whites were homeowners, while only 45% of Latinos,
46% of Blacks and 51% of Asians owned their homes. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN
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portunities for first-time homebuyers contributed significantly to the
immense difference between White and Black family net wealth. At
the start of the new millennium, White family net wealth (and corre-
sponding education and cultural development opportunities) 34 ° was
more than fourteen times greater than that of Black families-88,000
compared to $6,000.341
According to Siegel, one cannot judge the fairness of these kinds
of distributive practices without considering actual racial conditions.
Formal colorblindness avoids consideration of economic stratification
along racial lines by assuming a more or less level racial playing field.
It conceals the "distributive consequences or group-salient practices in
a misleading semantic code [of] race-neutral[ity]." 342
Siegel thus concludes that colorblindness is jurisprudentially
flawed because it "defines race in [masking] ways that are deeply at
odds with the [contextual] understandings of race that would seem to
be relevant to evaluating the justice of our distributive practices 3 43
along racial lines.3" As Professor Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.
observes,
HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1999 42 (2000). Modified version of the original
text, issued in 2003 is available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/h150-99.pdf.
340. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SO-
CIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 5 (1999) ("In contemporary America, race and property are intimately
linked and form the nexus for the persistence of black-white inequality."). Professor Conley
explains that since "wealth accumulation depends heavily on intergenerational support issues
such as gifts, informal loans and inheritances, net worth has the ability to pick up both the cur-
rent dynamics of race and the legacy of past inequalities that may be obscured in simple mea-
sures of income, occupation or education." Id. at 6.
341. See RAKESH KOCHAR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., The Wealth of Hispanic Households: 1996
to 2002, at 2 (Oct. 2004), at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/34.pdf. The median net worth of
Hispanic households in 2002 was $7,932, or nine percent of the median wealth of non-Hispanic
White households at the same time ($88,651), while the net worth of Blacks was only $5,988. Id.
This recent study found that, after adjusting for inflation, the net worth for White households
increased 17% between 1996 and 2002, and rose for Hispanic homes by 14%, but decreased for
Blacks by 16%. Id. The Pew study demonstrated that the wealth of Latino and Black house-
holds is less than one-tenth the wealth of White households even though Census data show their
income is two-thirds as high. Id. The report concluded that the reasons for this disparity are
minorities' limited access to financial markets and greater barriers to homeownership, since
ownership of a home bears a strong relationship to the net worth of a household. Id.
342. Siegel, supra note 272, at 101.
343. Id. at 99.
344. An example is Proposition 209, the "California Civil Rights Initiative" to "further
equality," which would have the (ostensibly) intended effect of reinforcing racial stratification.
See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L. J. 187 (1997). On the effects of Proposi-
tion 209 in law school admissions see William C. Kidder, Situating Asian Pacific Americans in the
Law School Affirmative Action Debate: Empirical Facts About Thernstrom's Rhetorical Acts, 7
ASIAN L.J. 29 (2000); Kidder, supra note 119.
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[T]he argument for colorblindness ultimately argues in favor of a
racialized status quo that leaves black people and other racial mi-
norities in an unequal position ...... "[R]acial status quo" [means]
the economic reality that African Americans are twice as likely to
be unemployed [and] less likely to be employed in positions that
provide status or higher income.3 45
Contextual race looks for the possibility of racial stratification
both by examining racial group history, current racial conditions and
by identifying and explaining relevant differences in assessing govern-
ment ends, means and motivations.
The masking function of ahistorical colorblindness hides the real-
ity that the "ways in which the legal system enforces social stratifica-
tion are various and evolve over time." '346 Siegel describes this
process as "preservation-through-transformation. '347 Social stratifica-
tion is preserved by those with political and economic power when, in
the face of mounting challenges to clear legal inequality, they change
the justificatory rhetoric and substantive rules enough to relieve social
pressure, but without fully dismantling the hierarchy.348
By repudiating past practices, like slavery and overt segregation,
formal colorblindness allows its supporters to subtly advocate preser-
vation of inequalities in today's racial order by transforming the justif-
icatory rhetoric. The law no longer espouses Black inferiority; it
ascribes to the "irrelevance of race." Yet, this irrelevance-of-race is
345. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the intersectionality of Oppres-
sion: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 167 (1994) (inter-
nal footnotes omitted); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard Ground, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2487, 2500 (2003) ("While colorblindness obscures entrenched racial inequality and renders the
racial stratifications in the economy and in accumulated wealth a product of individual failure
[contextual race does not ignore] the dynamics that produce significant barriers to attaining
equality.") (reviewing LANI GUNIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY (2002)). To
identify particular social practices that are "distributively just ... we would have to reason about
race as it is socially instantiated, whether in historical or cultural terms." Siegel, supra note 272,
at 100.
346. Siegel, supra note 27, at 1113.
347. Just as the "interpretation of equal protection offered in Plessy emerged from the
Court's efforts to disestablish slavery, the interpretation of equal protection we inherit to day has
emerged from the Court's efforts to disestablish segregation." Id. at 1129.
348. Id. at 1113. Professor Siegel elaborates,
[a]s civil rights advocates challenged the conventional practices and rationales support-
ing race and gender inequality, they precipitated a shift in the rule structure and justifi-
catory rhetoric of these status regimes. In time, an antidiscrimination principle that had
been elaborated with respect to the status-enforcing practices and rationales of the
early twentieth century became ill-suited for challenging the kinds of status-enforcing
practices and rationales that emerged in their wake.
Siegel, supra note 272, at 111.
2006]
Howard Law Journal
actually employed to invalidate affirmative action and preserve group
inequalities in major realms of American life.
As Siegel presciently notes, "[tloday, no less than the past, the
nation gives [new] reasons for sanctioning practices that perpetuate
the race and gender stratification of American society." '3 49 Is color-
blindness one of the "new reasons" given for that purpose? Will it
remain persuasive, or will it "one day appear to be [an] insubstantial
rationalization[ ] for practices that helped perpetuate entrenched rela-
tions of inequality? ' 3
50
Understandably, the most strident critics of contextual race in
strict scrutiny review are normatively devoted to colorblindness.5
Commentators Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom urge adherence
to what amounts to formal race in strict scrutiny review. The Thern-
stroms criticize the Grutter majority for "deceiv[ing] the American
people. '352 They view any use of race in decision-making as odious
because "if race [is] in the mix, then race [is] inevitably decisive. 3 53
In their view, not mentioning race is preferable to the only alterna-
tive-allowing race to "make all the difference. '354 Their view of race
leads to a peculiar rhetorical refraining of affirmative action pro-
grams. Michigan's race-as-a-factor admissions policy is pejoratively
cast as a "racial double-standard."355 Affirmative action is "ongoing
racial sorting, '356 the moral equivalent of Jim Crow.
349. Siegel, supra note 27, at 1147.
350. Id. at 1148.
351. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 37(1984) (arguing
that because of the irrelevance of race "[a]ll individuals should be treated the same under the
law, regardless of their race, religion, sex or other such social categories"); DINESH D'SouzA,
THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 297 (1995) (arguing that "[dis-
crimination] is hardly remedied by racial preferences which treat incompetent individuals as
competent on account of their membership in a favored group"); John Marquez Lundin, The
Call for Color-Blind Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 407, 409 (1997) (claiming that any
classifications based on race violate the Constitution and hinder attempts at equality). For an
analysis and critique of the normative arguments in favor of formal colorblindness, see John E.
Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit. An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirma-
tive Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313 (1994).
352. Abigail Thernstrom & Stephen Thernstrom, Secrecy and Dishonesty: The Supreme
Court, Racial Preferences, and Higher Education, 21 CONST. COMMENr. 251, 257 (2004). Some
scholarly criticism of Grutter attacks the "dishonesty" of upholding affirmative action, but does
not advance a substantive critique of the majority's shift toward contextual race. See e.g., Lino
Graglia, Fraud by the Supreme Court: Racial Discrimination by a State Institution of Higher Edu-
cation Upheld on "Diversity" Grounds, 36 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 57, 81 (2004).
353. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 352, at 252.
354. Id. at 253.
355. Id. at 253, 255.
356. Id. at 255. "At the center of that dishonesty lay the notion that, with ongoing racial
sorting, the nation would move beyond race-that old habits would bring new benefits." Id.
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Consistent with formal-race discourse, the Thernstroms' call for
colorblindness admonishes government decision-makers for their ob-
session with equality for Blacks in American society. "Preferential
policies are primarily driven by concern over the status of blacks in
American society, and as long as the admissions process at elite insti-
tutions of higher education fails to create a 'critical mass' of African
American students, schools will not abandon racial preferences unless
compelled to do so."35 Instead of overcoming a history of racial sub-
ordination, the Supreme Court's "dishonesty about racial equality
perpetuates the corruption surrounding uses of race that has been
deeply and perniciously embedded in the history of the nation. "358
Through their firestorm of words, the Thernstroms criticize Grut-
ter's contextual treatment of race. "Racial classifications in the
United States have a long and ugly history; racial subordination was
all about double standards, with different entitlements depending on
your racial identity. '359 Detached from historical and contemporary
realities, this abstract logic transforms affirmative action automatically
into racial discrimination-and more specifically, discrimination
against (but not subordination of) Whites. For this reason, Grutter "is
a bleak day in American constitutional law."'360 In effect, the Thern-
stroms disparage the Grutter majority for acknowledging that races
are not fungible-that Michigan Law School's admissions program is
not Jim Crow-style racial exclusion (completely excluding an entire
racial group from access to societal opportunity in order to maintain
their subordinated status).
The Thernstroms fail to make these distinctions. Nor do they
think the Constitution should. Instead, they advocate a kind of formal
race that sanitizes history beyond recognition.361 In their colorblind
view of history, as one scholar notes, the "Thernstroms inhabit a
world that has been turned upside down. In that world, power rela-
357. Id. at 265.
358. Id. at 267.
359. Id. at 274.
360. Id.
361. The Thernstroms advocate a colorblind reading of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act because they have been "radically rewritten behind closed doors to embrace
race-driven strategies." Id. at 256. The Thernstroms argue that the statutes were intended
merely to "open the restaurants on a color-neutral basis [and] enforce the Fifteenth Amend-
ment." Id. The social, political and historical context of racial segregation and the Civil Rights
Movement's struggle against racial oppression is completely absent from their analysis.
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tionships are inverted so that whites are powerless and blacks are
powerful."362
Justice Thomas, dissenting in Grutter, also attacked the majority's
contextual understanding of race. He criticized the majority's turn
away from colorblindness and "the Court's implicit rejection of
Adarand's holding that beneficial and burdensome racial classifica-
tions are equally invalid." '363 Thomas relied in part on the same rhe-
torical scheme as the Thernstroms, treating racial segregation of
Blacks as the legal equivalent of race-conscious programs aimed at
addressing the current effects of historical racism. He warned,
"[c]ontained within today's majority opinion is the seed of a new con-
stitutional justification for a concept I thought long and rightly re-
jected-racial segregation. ' 364
Like the Thernstroms, Thomas can only draw such an equiva-
lence31 6 by distorting racial history and the actual design of the Law
School's race-as-a-factor affirmative action program.366 For Thomas,
"the Equal Protection Clause renders the color of one's skin constitu-
tionally irrelevant. 367 Cast in the most beneficent light,368 Justice
362. Deborah Waire Post, The Salience of Race, 15 ToURO L. Rev. 351, 375 (1999). Profes-
sor Post explains that "[tlhe Thernstroms are not the only critics who use this technique, but they
are among the very worst when it comes to dredging up unconscious racism and playing with the
emotions of white readers." Id. at 373.
363. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 371 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
364. Id. at 365-66.
365. Professor Alan Freeman noted that this "facile assumption of equivalence becomes
questionable, however, when one recognizes that the very reason for focusing on race as a rele-
vant characteristic is our specific historical record of discrimination." Freeman, supra note 106,
at 285.
366. Justice Thomas, without apparent irony, cites the Korematsu decision as an appropriate
use of the strict scrutiny standard of review.
A majority of the Court has validated only two circumstances where 'pressing public
necessity' or a 'compelling state interest' can possibly justify racial discrimination by
state actors. First, the lesson of Korematsu is that national security constitutes a 'press-
ing public necessity,' though the government's use of race to advance that objective
must be narrowly tailored.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351-52 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
367. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 n.3.
368. Justice Thomas appeared most concerned with what he perceives to be the stigma at-
tached to beneficiaries of race-conscious policies. Michigan Law School's admissions policy
"stamps minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or
to adopt and attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (internal
citations omitted). Thomas criticized the contextual race view of the majority, admonishing that,
"[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications
can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the
government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of bur-
dens or benefits, it demeans us all." Id. at 354.
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Thomas invoked colorblindness to highlight what he perceives as the
stigmatization of beneficiaries of race-conscious decision-making. 69
Thomas' dissent nevertheless reverberates with tones of formal
colorblindness.
In sum, formal colorblindness justifies striking down race-con-
scious initiatives without carefully examining whether their goal is to
perpetuate historic forms of exclusion or promote equality through
inclusion. Cast in this realistic light, colorblindness may be seen in
two ways: at its best, as a social aspiration; at worst, as a mask for
maintaining racial stratification and rationalizing practices that sustain
group inequality.37 °
By contrast, the Court's close examination of the linkage of racial
group histories to current socio-economic conditions and its differing
assessments of inclusionary and exclusionary initiatives mark the em-
brace of a more contextual understanding of race and racial discrimi-
nation. This realism in equal protection analysis provides more
grounded and nuanced jurisprudential support for the Court's accept-
ance of race-in-context in strict scrutiny review.
CONCLUSION
In Korematsu v. United States,37' the Supreme Court announced
that it was subjecting the government's World War II exclusion of
West Coast Japanese Americans to the "most rigid scrutiny" and that
only "pressing public necessity" could justify the racial restriction.
The Court then contradicted itself by deferring to the government's
assertion-later found to be false-that "military necessity" justified
the racial exclusion and ultimately incarceration without charges or
trial. An ignominious start in the life of strict scrutiny review.
369. Scholars have noted that Justice Thomas may speak from personal feelings of stigmati-
zation. Professor Derrick Bell explains that Black Conservatives, like Thomas, "tend to be high
achievers who may feel diminished by the notion they got where they are because of affirmative
action. They are really trying to affirm that their status is the result of a fair fight." Bell, supra
note 25, at 370 (quoting Julianne Malveaux, Why Are the Black Conservatives All Men?, Ms.,
Mar./Apr. 1991, at 60); see also Bryan K. Fair, Taking Educational Caste Seriously: Why Grutter
Will Help Very Little, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1843, 1858 n.70 (2004) (noting that Thomas's Grutter
dissent "complains about overmatched minority students. Yet, [Thomas] does not indicate
whether he was overmatched at Holy Cross or Yale Law School.").
370. See Gotanda, supra note 40, at 62-63; see Siegel, supra note 27, at 85.
371. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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Strict scrutiny reemerged in its first modern incarnation with
Boiling v. Sharpe37 2 (contemporaneous to Brown) through Loving v.
Virginia.3 7 3 It invalidated the vestiges of state Jim Crow segregation
by means of a review that was strict in theory and fatal in fact. How-
ever, as state legislation and agency programs ended formal segrega-
tion, strict scrutiny turned its focus onto the only race-conscious target
in its sights-affirmative action programs. Still fatal in fact and treat-
ing all racial classifications as if they were the same, strict scrutiny
entombed programs designed to address continuing racial inequalities
rooted in past legalized segregation. With unacknowledged irony,
strict scrutiny's second modern incarnation stood equal protection
analysis on its head.
Over time, pressure mounted for a more realistic, more nuanced
strict scrutiny formulation. In 2003, after fits and starts, the Supreme
Court's majority embraced a third incarnation-what we are calling
"contextual strict scrutiny." By emphasizing the linkage of history to
current conditions and scrutinizing "relevant racial differences," the
new strict scrutiny now draws from a "racial realism" grounded in a
systematic examination of social science studies and documented his-
torical research. In doing so, it rejects formal colorblindness as the
lynchpin for equal protection analysis and, in appropriate situations,
sanctions government initiatives designed to address the effects of
long-standing discrimination.
Yet to date, the Court has not articulated an analytical method
for applying its race-in-context strict scrutiny review. For these rea-
sons, among justices, lower court judges and scholars, contextual strict
scrutiny engenders controversy.
With this situation in mind, this Article has offered a four-part
method for operationalizing contextual strict scrutiny distilled from
the Justices' opinions. A workable analytical method is particularly
important when the challenged government initiatives are designed to
promote present-day equality in the face of discriminatory legacies.
We have also laid a foundation for further debate by identifying and
assessing two salient jurisprudential implications: the import of the
contemporary version of Legal Realism, a racial realism, informing
372. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (declaring that "classifications based solely upon race must be
scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitution-
ally suspect").
373. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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the Court's "context matters" mandate and the comparative merits of
race-in-context analysis versus a formal version of colorblindness.
We close with the over-arching question: "Why does race-in-con-
text matter" for strict scrutiny review? From our vantage point, there
are three key responses. It matters first because the way strict scru-
tiny is conceived and applied directly affects peoples' daily lives and
life prospects. The difference between fatal-in-fact review and race-
in-context scrutiny in practical terms is this: it will in some instances
mean the difference between law school and no law school education
for a promising Native Hawaiian student with public school back-
ground and limited resources, who is his extended family's first to at-
tend professional school (let alone college), in a setting where
indigenous Hawaiians fall at the bottom of the state's socio-economic
ladder and are starkly underrepresented in the lawyers' bar.374
Second, it matters because a formal strict scrutiny review under-
cuts courts' capacity to engage the public in a sophisticated analysis of
one of the persistent, pressing issues of contemporary America-ra-
cial inequality. By contrast, when context matters in evaluating a gov-
ernment initiative, courts entertain in public view competing versions
of history as linked to current racial conditions along with arguments
about the realistic need for carefully framed government action. In
addition to rendering judgments on narrow legal questions, the courts
are storytelling institutions and their major cases are moral parables.
They "engage dialectically with other dominant political institutions,
with [people's] preexisting cultural assumptions, and other sources of
cultural authority."37 When realism informs judicial debate and con-
text matters, courts are better able to fulfill their integral public edu-
cational role of illuminating justice under law.
Finally, the tenor of courts' strict scrutiny review matters because
it bears on the judiciary's legitimacy. Will courts say one thing (an-
nouncing the most rigid scrutiny) and then do another (turn a blind
eye to racial realities), as the Supreme Court did in Korematsu-all to
strident, enduring criticism?376 Will courts automatically, without
careful examination of actual racial circumstances, invalidate all af-
374. See Eric K. Yamamoto & George K. Yamamoto, Ethnicity and the Hawaii Bar: Looking
Back, Looking Forward, 3-OCT HAW. B.J. 111 (1990).
375. Freeman, supra note 122, at 122.
376. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J.
489 (1945); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary
Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National Se-
curity Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986); Susan Kiyomi Serrano &
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firmative action programs? Or will courts seriously examine how his-
tory shapes current racial conditions and carefully assess the
importance of measures drawn to promote inclusion in areas of social
and economic life marked historically by social and legal exclusion?
Collectively, these differing questions illuminate the dismay ex-
pressed by Justice Harry Blackmun in 1989 about the Court majority's
then racial myopia: "One wonders whether the majority still believes
that race discrimination-or more accurately, race discrimination
against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers
that it ever was. ' 3 7 7 Contextual strict scrutiny says to the public, as
well as to judges and lawyers, that racial inequality was and is a prob-
lem in our society and that courts will engage government racial initia-
tives realistically through the most searching inquiry.
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Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution" in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN
L.J. 37 (2003).
377. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 442,462 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
